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Resum del Projecte
La idea principal darrera del concepte d'Internet de les coses (IoT) és connectar tot tipus
d'objectes quotidians, per permetre comunicar-se entre sí i que les persones es comuniquin
amb ells.  IoT és un ampli  concepte  que engloba una extensa gamma de tecnologies  i
aplicacions.  Aquest  document  dona  una  introducció  al  que  és  el  IoT,  les  seves
característiques fonamentals i les tecnologies que s'estan utilitzant actualment.
No obstant,  les  tecnologies  utilitzades en  el  IoT encara  estan evolucionant  i  madurant,
donant lloc a grans reptes que s'han de resoldre per a un desplegament exitós del IoT. La
seguretat és un dels reptes més significatius.
Els problemes de seguretat poden representar el major obstacle per l'acceptació general de
l'IoT. Aquest document presenta una avaluació dels objectius de seguretat en el  Iot,  les
seves amenaces  i  els  requisits  necessaris  per  assolir  aquests  objectius.  Es  realitza  un
estudi sobre un conjunt representatiu de tecnologies IoT en ús per avaluar el  seu estat
actual  respecte  a  la  seguretat.  Per  cada  solució,  es  dona  una  descripció  de  la  seva
funcionalitat,  les  seves proteccions  i  els  problemes trobats.  Finalment,  s'identifiquen  els
problemes comuns i es donen un conjunt de solucions futures.
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Resumen del Proyecto
La idea principal detrás del concepto de Internet de las cosas (IoT) es conectar todo tipo de
objetos cotidianos, para permitir comunicarse entre sí y que personas se comuniquen con
ellos.  IoT  es  un  amplio  concepto  que  abarca  una  extensa  gama  de  tecnologías  y
aplicaciones. Este documento da una introducción a lo que es el IoT, sus características
fundamentales y las tecnologías que se están utilizando actualmente.
Sin embargo, las tecnologías usadas en el IoT todavía están en evolución y madurando,
dando lugar a grandes desafíos que deben resolverse para un despliegue exitoso del IoT.
La seguridad es uno de las más significativos.
Los problemas de seguridad pueden representar el  mayor  obstáculo para la  aceptación
general del IoT. Este documento presenta una evaluación de los objetivos de seguridad en
el IoT, sus amenazas y los requisitos necesarios para alcanzar dichos objetivos. Se realiza
un estudio sobre un conjunto representativo de tecnologías IoT en uso para evaluar  su
estado actual respecto a la seguridad. Para cada solución, se da una descripción de su
funcionalidad, sus protecciones y los problemas encontrados. Finalmente, se identifican los
problemas comunes y se dan un conjunto de soluciones futuras.
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Abstract
The main idea behind the concept of the Internet of Things (IoT) is to connect all kinds of
everyday objects, thus enabling them to communicate to each other and enabling people to
communicate  to  them.  IoT  is  an  extensive  concept  that  encompasses  a  wide  range  of
technologies and applications. This document gives an introduction to what the IoT is, its
fundamental characteristics and the enabling technologies that are currently being used.
However,  the  technologies  for  the  IoT are  still  evolving  and  maturing,  leading  to  major
challenges that need to be solved for a successful deployment of the IoT. Security is one of
the most significant ones.
Security issues may represent the greatest obstacle to general acceptance of the IoT. This
document presents an assessment of the IoT security goals, its threats and the security
requirements to achieve the goals. A survey on a representative set of already deployed IoT
technologies is done to assess the current state of the art with regards to security. For each
solution, a description of its functionality,  its security options and the issues found in the
literature is given. Finally, the common issues are identified and a set of future solutions are
given.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Project context
IoT technologies and devices are being widely deployed. 500 billion devices are expected to
be  connected  to  the  Internet  by  2030  [1].  The  number  and  variety  of  applications  is
increasing too: from environmental sensing to smart home control and autonomous cars. 
The basic concept behind the IoT is to connect all kinds of everyday objects, thus enabling
them to communicate to each other and enabling people to communicate to them. They will
also be equipped with sensors or actuators in order to interact with the physical world.
However, the technologies for the IoT are still evolving and maturing. There are a plethora of
specifications  and  standards.  So,  a  lot  of  technical  difficulties  need  to  be  solved  for  a
successful deployment. One of the most significant challenge in IoT is security.
1.2. Objectives
During this  project  a general  understanding of  the Internet  of  Things concept  is  gained,
describing its fundamental characteristics, the enabling technologies and the challenges and
issues  to  its  deployment.  An  assessment  of  the  IoT security  needs  is  devised  and  the
security of a representative set of already deployed IoT networking solutions is performed.
The results of this study can be used as a starting point for anyone who wants to analyze the
security aspects of different IoT networking solutions.
1.3. Document structure
This document is divided in the following chapters:
• Chapter  2 “Background“ gives a general view on what is the IoT, its fundamental
characteristic and applications. Then, a description of the enabling technologies is
given, especially focusing on the IoT networking solutions. Lastly, the challenges to a
successful IoT deployment are introduced.
• Chapter  3 “Security for  the IoT“ gives an introduction and discusses the security
challenges to the IoT. It  describes the security goals the IoT need to enforce, its
related threats and the security requirements to achieve the goals.
• Chapter 4 “Security survey on networking technologies“ shows the results of a survey
of  the  security  options  and  found  issues  of  the  set  of  existing  IoT  networking
technologies on the market today. For each solution, a description of its functionality,
its security options and the issues found in the literature is given.
• Chapter 5 “Analysis of the survey results” presents an analysis of the results of the
survey comparing all the solutions to each other. Then, a discussion on the issues
that  are common to all  the surveyed technologies and some future solutions are
presented.
• Chapter 6 “Conclusions” presents the conclusions of this study.
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2. Background
This  chapter  presents  the  current  state  of  the  Internet  of  Things.  Firstly,  the  term  is
introduced along with its fundamental characteristics, its applications, a general architecture
and a set of its enabling technologies. Finally, an overview of the issues that the deployment
of the IoT is facing is presented.
2.1. The Internet of Things
The term Internet of Things, from now on IoT, is seen as an emerging topic of technical,
social and economic significance. Over the past few years, the IoT appeared across the
world both in general and specialized magazines. There are lots of articles describing its
potential  to  transform  our  daily  lives  by  combining  Internet  connectivity  with  consumer
product, cars, sensors and other everyday objects.
In 2014 IoT ranked top in  Gartner hype cycle  [2] for  emerging technologies and slightly
below  in  2016  [3].  With  different  available  technologies,  IoT  developments  may  select
different communication methodologies and architectures.
Projections for the impact of IoT on the Internet and economy are impressive, according to
Cisco, 500 billion devices are expected to be connected to the Internet by 2030 [1].
The general idea of this trend is to interconnect everything that is able to embed a small
computing and communication device that can offer valuable information or actuation to the
physical world.
Figure 2.1: IoT as an emerging technology
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2.1.1. A definition for the IoT
The concept of the Internet of Things (IoT) was introduced in 1999, after the explosion of the
wireless devices market, and the introduction of the Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)
and the Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) technologies. It was coined by British technology
pioneer Kevin Ashton to describe a system in which objects in the physical world could be
connected to the Internet by sensors.
Actually,  there  is no single,  official  or  universally accepted definition of  the IoT.  Different
groups  have  proposed  different  definitions  of  what  IoT  means  and  what  are  its  most
important attributes.
• The  Internet  Architecture  Board  (IAB) begins  the  RFC  7452,  “Architectural
Considerations  in  Smart  Object  Networking’’  [4] saying that  the  term “Internet  of
Things” (IoT) denotes a trend where a large number of embedded devices employ
communication services offered by the Internet protocols.  Many of these devices,
often  called  “smart  objects,’’  are  not  directly  operated  by  humans,  but  exist  as
components in buildings or vehicles, or are spread out in the environment.
• In the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), the term “smart object networking” is
commonly used in reference to the Internet of Things. In this context, “smart objects”
are devices that typically have significant constraints, such as limited power, memory,
and processing resources, or bandwidth.
• The European Research Cluster on the Internet of Things (IERC) definition states
that IoT is “A dynamic global network infrastructure with self-configuring capabilities
based on standard and interoperable communication protocols where physical and
virtual “things” have identities, physical attributes, and virtual personalities and use
intelligent interfaces, and are seamlessly integrated into the information network.” [5].
• The Internet Society, in “The Internet of Things: An Overview”  [6], defines the term
Internet of Things as generally referring to scenarios where network connectivity and
computing capability extends to objects, sensors and everyday items not normally
considered computers, allowing these devices to generate, exchange and consume
data with minimal human intervention.
• The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) published the document
“Towards a definition of the Internet of Things (IoT)”  [7], which aims to give an all-
inclusive definition of the IoT. To do so, it  first  compares the terms IoT and CPS.
Then, compare it to the WSN and finally gives the following definition “An IoT is a
network  that  connects  uniquely  identifiable  “Things”  to  the  Internet.  The “Things”
have  sensing/actuation  and  potential  programmability  capabilities.  Through  the
exploitation of unique identification and sensing, information about the “Thing” can be
collected and the state of the ‘Thing’ can be changed from anywhere, anytime, by
anything.“.
• The International Telegraph Union Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-
T), in the document “Y.2060 - Overview of the Internet of things” [8], defines the IoT
as “a global infrastructure for the information society, enabling advanced services by
interconnecting  (physical  and  virtual)  things  based  on  existing  and  evolving
interoperable  information  and  communication  technologies  (ICT).”  and  the  term
“thing” with regard to the IoT as “an object of the physical world (physical things) or
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the  information  world  (virtual  things),  which  is  capable  of  being  identified  and
integrated into communication networks.”
2.1.2. Fundamental characteristics
From a security point of view, in the IoT every 'thing' is connected which results in significant
security threats,  such as threats towards confidentiality,  authenticity and integrity of  both
data and services. The fundamental characteristics of the IoT can be identified as follows:
• Unequivocally identifiable: IoT devices must be addressable in order to obtain data
from them or to able to send commands to them. Authentication and authorization
must be a key concept in the identification.
• Interconnectivity: With regard to the IoT, anything can be interconnected with the
global  information  and  communication  infrastructure.  Security  in  this  connectivity
must be enforced.
• Heterogeneity:  The devices in  the IoT are heterogeneous as based on different
hardware platforms and networks. They can interact with other devices or service
platforms through different networks. Some of them may be resources constrained
devices. The design of the security controls must take this fact into account.
• Dynamic changes:  The state  of  devices  change dynamically,  e.g.,  sleeping and
waking  up,  connected  and/or  disconnected  as  well  as  the  context  of  devices
including  location  and  speed.  Moreover,  the  number  of  devices  can  change
dynamically. Bootstrapping and device commissioning must be securely executed.
• Enormous  scale:  The  number  of  devices  that  need  to  be  managed  and  that
communicate with each other will be at least an order of magnitude larger than the
devices connected to the current Internet. The ratio of communication triggered by
devices  as compared to communication  triggered by humans will  noticeably  shift
towards device-triggered communication. The impact of a security breach may be
considerable.
2.1.3. Applications
The IoT includes a wide variety of devices and diverse applications, which call for different
deployment scenarios. There are many market segments and verticals poised to drive IoT
growth, some of them are:
• Consumer  goods:  Newer  smartphones  are  including  more  and  more  sensors.
Another  successful  vertical  is  smart  homes  with  smart  appliances,  lighting  and
curtain controls,  multimedia entertainment,  security systems,  etc.  Smart  cars with
self-parking and voice commanding capabilities are becoming a reality.
• Smart transportation: It includes both public and private transport. Public transports
activities include train control,  electronically accessible timetables and ticketing. In
the private  transport  domain,  a  major  focus is  vehicle  automation including both
vehicle control and system such as navigation and climate control. IoT applications
can be the so called Car2X (car-to-car, car-to-infrastructure) or completely internal to
the car. Another aspect of smart transportation is the appearance of services like car
sharing for people who only need a car occasionally.
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• Energy  distribution:  Smart  grids  are  enabling  the  management  of  the  energy
distribution to make  it more efficient and more resilient. It is using information and
communications technology to gather and act on information.
• Smart  city:  It  is  a  conceptual  model  that  uses  information  and  communication
technologies to improve efficiency and development of all areas of urban life.
• Distribution and logistics: Stock accounting and tracking is saving time and money
in the areas of inventory management, order fulfillment, warehousing, etc.
• Industrial and manufacturing: It helps increasing industrial automation and material
flow  traceability.  Furthermore,  remote  and  predictive  maintenance  are  improving
efficient factory operation.
• Smart Home: It uses the data to collect from environment sensors like temperature,
humidity,  lighting  and  noise  levels  to  control  air  conditioning,  lighting,  heating,
ventilation and security at home.
• eHealth:  It  is  a broad segment  that  includes telemedicine,  virtual  healthcare and
remote patient monitoring.
2.1.4. IoT architecture
A general architecture of the IoT can be described by defining three generic layers:
• Physical or Perception layer: Also known as the sensor layer, is implemented as
the bottom layer  in  IoT architecture.  The perception  layer  interacts  with  physical
devices and components through smart devices (RFID, sensors, actuators, etc.). Its
main objectives are to connect things into IoT network, and to measure, collect, and
process  the  state  information  associated  with  these  things  via  deployed  smart
devices, transmitting the processed information into upper layer via layer interfaces.
• Network layer: Also known as the transmission layer, is implemented as the middle
layer  in  IoT  architecture.  The  network  layer  is  used  to  receive  the  processed
information provided by perception layer and determine the routes to transmit the
data  and  information  to  the  IoT  hub,  devices,  and  applications  via  integrated
networks. The network layer is the most important layer in IoT architecture, because
various  devices  (hub,  switching,  gateway,  cloud  computing  perform,  etc.),  and
various communication  technologies  (Bluetooth,  WiFi,  Long-Term Evolution  (LTE),
etc.) are integrated in this layer. The network layer should transmit data to or from
different  things  or  applications,  through  interfaces  or  gateways  among
heterogeneous  networks,  and  using  various  communication  technologies  and
protocols.
• Application layer: Also known as the business layer, is implemented as the top layer
in IoT architecture. The application layer receives the data transmitted from network
layer and uses the data to provide required services or operations. For instance, the
application  layer  can provide the storage service  to  backup received data  into  a
database, or provide the analysis service to evaluate the received data for predicting
the future state of physical devices. A number of applications exist in this layer, each
having  different  requirements.  Examples  include  smart  grid,  smart  transportation,
smart cities, etc.
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2.2. Enabling technologies
To allow all the expected billion of devices to communicate with each other, a communication
technology is needed. Currently, there are plenty of wireless communication standards and
specifications and each of  them have strengths for  certain applications.  State of  the art
classic communication networks are being adapted to support IoT characteristics.
A set of networking technologies was compiled with the objective to have a representative
set  of  technologies across the current  state of  the art.  In that  sense,  technologies were
evaluated based on their range and data rate, implemented layers, network type, network
topology, frequency used, power consumption and the cost added to the application. Among
the selected ones, it can be found classic and newer ones, coming from the WSN or from
the cellular networks, ones that use licensed or unlicensed frequency bands and that are
open or proprietary. The following table lists the set of representative technologies chosen
for the survey and their characteristics:
Layers Network Topology Data rate Range Freq. Power Cost
Ethernet PHY -MAC
LAN,
WAN star 1 Gbps 100 m - high high
PLC PHY -MAC
LAN,
WAN P2P 200 Mbps
200 m -
3 km - high low
RFID PHY PAN P2P 1kbps up to 5 m 125 kHz -915 Mhz very low very low
NFC PHY PAN P2P up to 400kbps 10 cm
125 kHz -
915 Mhz very low very low
Bluetooth PHY -APP LAN
Star,
mesh 1 Mbps
50 m -
100 m 2.4 GHz moderate moderate
WiFi PHY -MAC LAN
Star, ad-
hoc
100 kbps,
1 Mbps -
6.7 Gbps
50 m
1 km
900 MHz
2.4 GHz
5 GHz
high moderate
802.15.4 PHY -MAC HAN star, P2P 250 kbps
10 m -
100 m
915 MHz,
2.4 GHz very low low
ZigBee NET -APP HAN
star,
mesh,
tree
250 kbps 10 m -100 m
915 MHz,
2.4 GHz low low
Thread NET - TP HAN tree, mesh 250 kbps 10 m -100 m
915 MHz,
2.4 GHz low low
Z-Wave NET -APP HAN mesh
9.6, 40,
100 kbps 30 m < 1GHz low low
SigFox PHY -APP WAN star 100 bps 17 km < 1GHz very low low
LoRaWAN PHY -APP WAN star 10 kbps 5 - 15 km < 1GHz low low
EC-GSM-IoT PHY -NET WAN star
350 bps -
70 kbps 5 - 15 km
900 MHz
1800 MHz moderate moderate
LTE-M PHY -NET WAN star
up to
1 Mbps 5 - 10 km
450MHz -
3.5 GHz moderate moderate
NB-IoT PHY -NET WAN star 250 kbps 5 - 15 km
450MHz -
3.5 GHz low moderate
Table 2.1: Summary of networking technologies
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In order to group the surveyed technologies, grouping criteria must be defined. Most of the
technologies are based on wireless communications. So, a first group can be defined for the
wired networking solutions in order to differentiate them.
For the wireless solutions, the following graphic show their range vs data rate:
As can be seen in the figure,  the wireless technologies can be basically grouped by its
range.  Three  different  range  groups  can  be  defined:  Very  short-range,  Short-range  and
Long-range.
It was seen during the project that grouping them by its range is an adequate criteria. It was
found that all the technologies in a certain range tend to implement similar solutions. And
that these solutions are quite different than the implemented in other ranges. For instance,
ZigBee (short-range) is quite different than technologies such RFID (very short-range) and
NB-IoT (long-range)  but  have lots  of  similarities  with  technologies  such as  Z-Wave and
Thread. 
2.2.1. Wired networking technologies
Wired networks offer a great bandwidth at the expense of its cost and lack of flexibility. This
was the first approach to connect sensor and actuators (e.g. surveillance cameras).
• Ethernet: It is the most used MAC protocol in the computer network. It is a known
technology  with  wide  manufacturer  support.  It  is  being  deployed  in  some  new
buildings in a structured way along the electric wires. On the other hand, the need of
Figure 2.2: Wireless technologies range vs data rate
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a wire for every device connection makes the network to be static and costly to be
modified.
• Power Line Communications (PLC): It uses the building's existing electrical wiring
for  data  transmission.  It  has  an  easy  and  low  cost  deployment  because  of
exploitation of the existing wires. The most used existing standards for PLC is the
HomePlug AV. A PLC adapter is connected to each of the devices, the adapters are
then plugged into their wall sockets to form an Ethernet network between the devices
over the electric wiring.
2.2.2. Very short-range networking technologies
Normally  used  for  identification,  tracking  and  application  that  requires  direct  human
interaction with the device.
• RFID: Radio Frequency Identification, is a technology where information stored on a
microchip can be read remotely, without physical contact using energy. In RF there
are several  frequency ranges used including Low Frequency (LF,  125 kHz),  High
Frequency (HF, 13.56 MHz), Ultra High Frequency (UHF, 433 MHz, 860-960 MHz)
and Microwave (2.45 GHz, 5.8 GHz).  These bands,  in  general,  do not  require a
license if the transmitted power is limited. Some bands can be used globally (HF)
while others are specific to certain regions (UHF in US, EU, and Japan).
• NFC: Near Field communication (NFC) is a short-range, high-frequency (13.56MHz)
RF technology that allows user to exchange data and information between two NFC
enabled  devices.  In  future  NFC  can  be  one  of  the  most  used  communication
technology due to following reason. NFC provides easy network access and data
sharing, without much lengthy process of handshaking. NFC can be configured with
user intent and provide much better accessibility to device.
2.2.3. Short-range networking technologies
These  technologies  are  normally  used  for  Wireless  Sensors  Networks  (WSN)  and
applications  that  requires  several  sensors/actuators  spread  in  a  short-range  (e.g.  home
automation).
• Bluetooth: Bluetooth is based on the IEEE 802.15.1 standard. It is a low power, low
cost  wireless  communication  technology  suitable  for  data  transmission  between
mobile devices over a short range (5 - 150 m). The Bluetooth standard defines a
personal area network (PAN) communication. It operates in 2.4 GHz band. The data
rate in various versions of the Bluetooth ranges from 1 Mbps to 24 Mbps. The ultra-
low power, low cost version of this standard is named as Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE
or Bluetooth Smart). Earlier, in 2010 BLE was merged with Bluetooth standard v4.0.
During the redaction of this report, Bluetooth Mesh was published to enable many-to-
many communications.
• Wi-Fi:  IEEE  802.11  is  a  collection  of  Wireless  Local  Area  Network  (WLAN)
communication  standards.  For  example,  802.11a  operates  in  the  5  GHz  band,
802.11b and 802.11g operate in the 2.4 GHz band, 802.11n operates in the 2.4/5
GHz bands, 802.11ac operates in the 5 GHz band and 802.11ad operates in the 60
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GHz band.  These standards provide data rates from 1 Mbps to 6.75 Gbps.  WiFi
provides communication range in the order of 20 m (indoor) to 100 m (outdoor).
802.11ah, and the corresponding WiFi HaLoW, was published in 2017. It uses 900
MHz band to provide extended range networks,  albeit  with lower data rates,  and
benefits from low power consumption.
• 802.15.4:  It  defines  a  low-rate  wireless  personal  area  network.  It  specifies  the
Physical and datalink layers. It  is  the basis for  Zigbee and Thread specifications.
Alternatively, it can be used with 6LoWPAN to enable IPv6 as upper layer. 802.15.4
supports several radio bands and the last of its versions adopts channel hopping
strategy to improve robustness against external interference. It is seen as the low
layers of a standard IoT system.
• ZigBee:  The  ZigBee  Alliance  has  developed  a  very  low-cost,  very  low-power
consumption,  IEEE  802.15.4-based  specification  for  a  suite  of  high-level
communication protocols used to create, for instance, a PAN with small, low-power
digital radios, such as for home automation or medical device data collection. The
ZigBee  network  layer  supports  star,  tree,  and  mesh  topologies.  Its  low  power
consumption limits transmission distances to 10 - 100 meters line-of-sight, a defined
rate  of  250 kbps,  which is  best  suited  for  intermittent  data  transmissions  from a
sensor  or  input  device.  IP addressable  devices  is  introduced with  the ZigBee IP
specification.
• Thread:  Thread  is  an  IPv6  based  networking  protocol.  It  uses  6LoWPAN  and
802.15.4 as a base for mesh communication. It is a protocol formed by a set of public
standards and all of its nodes are IP-addressable. 
• Z-wave:  Z-Wave primarily  allows  reliable  transmission of  short  messages from a
control unit to one or more nodes in a network. Its architecture comprises five main
layers: the physical, Medium Access Control, transfer, routing, and application layers.
It uses two types of device controllers and slaves. Controllers poll or send commands
to slaves, which either reply to or execute the controllers’ commands.
2.2.4. Long-range networking technologies
The option to connect objects spread over the world is a challenge that has some similarities
with the paradigm of cellular  networks which aimed at  connecting people.  This similarity
attracted the interest of mobile network providers to adapt its infrastructure to the IoT.
• SigFox: SigFox is an operated telecommunication network, dedicated to the Internet
of  Things.  It  utilizes  ultra  narrow-band  signals  and  requires  little  energy.  It  was
conceived  for  remote  devices  that  don’t  have  a lot  to  say,  need  to  be  very
inexpensive, require very small power budgets and require very long range. It is an
operated network that relays low-rate messages to distant devices over a range of up
to 17 km.
• EC-GSM-IoT,  NB-IoT and  LTE-M: EC-GSM-IoT is  based on eGPRS and designed
as  a  high  capacity,  long  range  and  low energy.  NB-IoT  is  a  narrow-band  radio
technology  designed  for  the  Internet  of  Things  (IoT)  and  is  one  of  a  range  of
technologies  standardized  by  the  3rd  Generation  Partnership  Project  (3GPP).  It
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operates in a licensed spectrum band. LTE Machine Type Communication Category
M1 (LTE-M) reuses the already in place LTE infrastructure reducing its complexity
and speed in order to enhance battery life time.
• LoRaWAN: LoRaWAN is an open protocol designed to integrate billions of devices in
the Internet  of  Things.  It  is  maintained by the LoRa Alliance,  an open,  non-profit
association of members. It provides low-rate, low-power, long-range communications
between end-devices and Network and Application servers. It  is put on top of the
physical LoRa modulation that is based on spread-spectrum and a variation of chirp
spread spectrum.
2.2.5. Communication protocols
These are the protocols that are used to transfer the data to and from internet and devices.
• 6LoWPAN:  The 6LoWPAN group has defined mechanisms for  encapsulation and
header  compression that  allow IPv6 packets  to  be sent  and received over  IEEE
802.15.4 based networks. Since IPv6 requires support of packets sizes much larger
than the largest IEEE 802.15.4 frame size, an adaptation layer is defined. It carries
IPv6 datagrams over such constrained links, taking into account limited bandwidth,
memory,  or  energy resources that  are  expected in  applications  such as  wireless
sensor networks.
2.3. Challenges of the IoT
The  IoT  raises  significant  technological  challenges  that  could  detriment  its  successful
deployment. Three of the important ones are Interoperability and Standardization, Privacy
and Security.
2.3.1. Interoperability and Standardization
State of the art  IoT suffers from platform fragmentation and lack of established technical
standards  that  describe how the different  parts  of  the  technology stack  should  interact.
Instead, large players and industry organizations use their own solutions. Some segments,
such as industrial, still rely on a small set of proprietary, incompatible technology standards
issued by the major players, as they have done for many years.
This lack of  converged or interoperable standards may slow IoT adoption or  discourage
device manufacturers and others from developing new technological solutions, since they do
not  know  whether  their  innovations  will  meet  the  guidelines  that  eventually  become
dominant. In addition, IoT players will have difficulty developing end-to-end security solutions
without common standards.
2.3.1.1. Standard Developing Organizations (SDOs)
Multiple regional and international organizations are creating and proposing standards on
how devices connect and communicate.
An effort to encourage the larger SDOs to strengthen collaboration and cooperation is being
carried out by asking for regular progress report events to advertise the progress with the
IoT standards, specifications in order to avoid reinventing similar but not compliant ones.
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These organizations  include standardization  bodies  or  associations.  Figure  2.3 shows  a
landscape of the SDO and alliances involved in the IoT.
The major standardization bodies that are active in the IoT definition include the following:
• IEEE:  It launched the P-2413 standardization projects  [9], which aims to build an
architectural  framework  for  IoT,  identify  commonalities  and  relationships  among
various IoT verticals, define abstractions, provide a reference model, define building
blocks  and  provide  mechanism to  develop multi-tier  systems from these  building
blocks. The standard intends to supply a quadruple trust feature (protection, security,
privacy,  and safety).  Its  goals are to accelerate the growth of  the IoT market  by
reducing the industry fragmentation.
The IEEE claim that there are more than 350 standards that are applicable to the IoT,
that 40 of them are being revised to better support the IoT and that there are more
than 110 new IoT-related standards in development. For instance,  the IEEE issued
the IEEE-802.15.4 that is widely used as the physical and datalink layer of several of
the already deployed IoT solutions.
• ITU:  The ITU-Global  Standards  Initiative  on the Internet  of  Things (IoT-GSI)  [10]
focuses  on  definitions,  overviews,  requirements,  architecture  and  work  plan  for
deploying the IoT. They published some recommendations like the Y.2060 - Overview
of Internet of Things [8].
• IETF:  It  contributed to the IPv6 supporting by limited-energy devices in IPv6 over
Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPAN) [11]. Second, IEEE issued
the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [12] for resource-constrained devices to
facilitate translation to HTTP for integration purpose with web application. Third, IETF
Figure 2.3: IoT SDOs and Alliances landscape
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developed IPv6 Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPL) protocol
[13].  Fourth,  IETF  proposed  an  integrated  web  services  for  M2M  and  IoT
applications, called Constrained RESTful Environment (CoRE) [14].
• IOT-A: The Internet of Things - Architecture (IOT-A)  [15] proposes an architectural
reference model for IoT. They define suite of key building blocks. The main objective
is  to  assist  providers  and  researchers  when  they  have  to  make  their  technical
choices.
• ETSI:  It  has  defined  two  main  technical  committees:  ETSI  Machine-to-Machine
(M2M) [16] and ETSI Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) [17]. ETSI M2M focuses on
services,  functional  requirements,  interfaces  and  architecture  of  M2M  solutions,
namely: smart grids, health, connected consumers, transportation, and smart cities.
ETSI ITS debates all types of vehicular communications.
• OneM2M:  The  global  standards  initiative  for  M2M  communications  and  IoT
(OneM2M)  [18].  Many  standardization  organizations  are  assembled  to  generate
many  specifications  for  a  common  M2M  Service  Layer.  OneM2M  is  working  to
consolidate a lot of regional work that has already been done.
2.3.1.2. Industry alliances
IoT is growing fast and since standards organizations move relatively slow, many alliances
or consortiums have been created to fill in the gap. Created from commercial vendors, they
develop  specifications  and  promote  collaboration  by  partners  but  may  compete  against
others. Many new industry coalitions have emerged alongside traditional SDOs. They have
defined their own specification. The most important ones are the following:
• ZigBee Alliance: Established in 2002, the ZigBee Alliance [19] is an open, non-profit
association  of  members  dedicated  to  the  development  of  the  family  of  ZigBee
specifications.
• Thread Group: Established in 2014, the Thread Group [20] is defining and promoting
the use of the royalty-free Thread networking technology.
• Z-Wave Alliance: Established in 2005, the Z-Wave Alliance [21] is dedicated to the
development and extension of Z-Wave technology.
• SigFox: Created in 2010, it is a private company that runs the SigFox network [22]
since 2012.
• LoRa Alliance: Established in 2015, is an open, non-profit association [23] dedicated
to maintain and develop the usage of the LoRa technology and LoRaWAN systems.
• NFC Forum: Established in 2005, is a non-profit industry association [24] dedicated
to maintain and develop the use of NFC.
2.3.2. Privacy
Data  privacy  will  play  an  important  role  in  IoT  deployments.  Because  IoT  systems  will
produce and deal with personally identifiable information. An attacker can use these kinds of
data which can pose a privacy problem for those who are unaware of the presence of the
devices and have no meaningful influence over how that collected information is used.
Security Issues in Internet of Things 23
Many of the IoT devices are designed to be embedded in the environment where a user
does not notice the device nor its collected data. The user might not be aware that a sensor
exists in her surroundings posing some privacy concerns.  For instance, some regulation
exists in the case of street monitoring cameras, where the user is alerted with a warning sign
that the place is being monitored by surveillance cameras.
Legal issues also are arising related to the privacy in the IoT. It is in discussion who owns the
data: if the sensed user or the device manufacturer. For example, in most of the vehicles
since 2013 there is a device called Event Data Recorder (EDR) or “black box”. This device is
storing information like vehicle’s speed, accelerator and brake pedals readings in order to
perform accident reconstruction. Some vehicle manufacturer are even constantly monitoring
the driver with an in-vehicle camera to implement driver drowsiness detection. All of these
kinds of data are valuable for instance to insurance companies in order to define the liability
in case of vehicle accident. On the other hand, the privacy of the end user is endangered by
these practices.
2.3.3. Security
Security in the IoT has already captured headlines across the world.  Security issues may
represent  the greatest  obstacle to growth and deployment of  the Internet  of  Things. So,
security  is  a  key requirement  in  the  IoT.  In  the  following  chapter,  the  security  risk  and
challenges to the IoT are described in more detail.
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3. Security for the IoT
In  this  chapter,  the  security  risk  and  challenges  to  a  successful  IoT  deployment  are
introduced.  Then,  it  is  presented  the  security  goals,  its  related  threats  and  security
requirement for the secure operation of an IoT system.
3.1. Security risks
IoT devices may present a variety of potential security risks that could be exploited to harm
consumers by:
• Enabling unauthorized access and misuse of personal information:  A lack of
security can allow an adversary to have access to data stored or transmitted by a
device. For example, a  hacked baby monitoring doll  cameras  [25] or talking dolls
acting as spies [26].
• Facilitating attacks on other systems:  Vulnerabilities in a particular device may
facilitate  attacks  on  the  consumer’s  network  to  which  it  is  connected,  or  enable
attacks on other systems. For example, a horde of IoT devices infected with malware
were used to attack the Internet infrastructure, causing shutdowns across Europe
and North America [27].
• Creating safety risks: Everyday more systems are being controlled and monitored
by computer-based algorithms, becoming Cyber-physical systems. A security flaw in
one of these systems may have an impact on the safety of its user. For example, two
security researchers that were able to remotely control a moving car [28] or a door
lock that was remotely disabled by device manufacturer after customer’s negative
review on the product published online [29].
Although  each  of  these  risks  exists  with  traditional  computers  and  networks,  they  are
aggravated in the context of the IoT systems due to its particular characteristics.
3.2. IoT Security challenges
The Internet of Things is facing security challenges that differ vastly from regular desktop
computing, due to the unique constraints.
• Massive  scale:  End  devices  like  sensors,  actuators  and  consumer  devices  are
designed to be deployed in a massive scale that will be orders of magnitude beyond
the traditional connected devices. Therefore, existing tools, methods and strategies
commonly used may need new considerations when used to the IoT. Furthermore,
the impact of compromising an IoT system can be misused at scale, e.g. to perform a
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack.
• Constrained devices: Many of the IoT devices, due to its size and power limitations,
may  not  support  the  same  level  of  security  that  the  one  expected  from  more
traditional Internet connected device. Current IoT security technology is insufficiently
sophisticated.  Effective  end-to-end  security  solutions  that  use  leading-edge
components are lacking. Processing capabilities are becoming less of an issue as
time  passes  since  increasingly  faster  chips  are  developed  every  year.  Power
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requirements are a big constraint for the current IoT affecting the processing speed,
bandwidth,  temperature  and/or  battery life.  This  restricts  the choice of  preventive
techniques, such as cryptography, which can be applied as a first line of defense
against attacks that are launched against individual nodes and the entire network.
• Identical devices: Many of the IoT deployments will consist in collections of identical
or  near  identical  devices.  This  fact  magnifies  the  potential  impact  of  a  security
vulnerability  on  one  of  the  devices.  Standardization  and  multiple  interoperable
devices manufactured by different vendors may minimize this challenge.
• Long lifespan: Many of the IoT devices will be deployed with an intended service life
of  several  years  (e.g.  10 years  in  the vehicles).  This  lifespan is  longer  than the
typically  associated  to  traditional  connected  devices.  Security  mechanisms  at
deployment time may not be adequate for the full  lifespan as the security threats
evolve. Long-term support and management is a challenge to the IoT.
• Cyber-physical Systems: Many of the IoT devices can affect the physical world,
enabling potential attacks that may have greater impact than purely virtual attacks. A
system malfunction may endanger the privacy and safety of the users, for instance in
application areas such as health care or critical infrastructure.
• Cross-device dependencies: IoT devices can interact with other devices via explicit
channels (e.g. a single app may use multiple IoT devices) or implicitly by affecting the
physical  world  around them (e.g.,  an  IoT heater  may trigger  an IoT temperature
sensor). The result is that the security for an IoT deployment are likely to be complex
and dynamic since they depend on both physical (e.g. environmental parameters)
and computational (e.g., the state of other related devices) contexts.
• Physically  accessible:  Many  of  the  IoT  devices  are  deployed  in  places  where
physical  security is  difficult  to  achieve.  An adversary with  physical  access to the
device can apply more attack techniques than the one with only remote access to the
device. Anti-tamper features may be considered for this kind of devices.
• Wireless communications:  Most of the networking technologies used by the IoT
are wireless communications on known and frequently used frequency bands. Due to
the broadcast nature of wireless networks, an attacker armed with tools capable of
capturing  and  injecting  wireless  information  can  inject  forged  packets  into  the
network. Networking technologies must take this fact into account to mitigate them.
• Not  Managed:  Many  of  the  IoT  devices  are  designed  without  the  ability  to  be
reconfigured  or  upgraded.  These  mechanisms  may  be  not  practical  to  resource
constrained devices. Furthermore, found vulnerabilities in one of these devices will
perpetually remain if a costly recall is not performed. Many companies, particularly
those developing low-end devices, may lack economic incentives to provide ongoing
support or software security updates at all, leaving consumers with unsupported or
vulnerable devices shortly after purchase.
• Unattended devices: Many of them are designed to work in an unattended way with
no manner of user interaction. So, no direct user monitoring or configuration can be
performed.  In  many cases  the user  does  not  have any insight  that  an  exploited
device  is  performing operations  other  than the intended  ones.  A security  breach
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might  persist  for  a  long  time  before  being  noticed and corrected  if  correction  or
mitigation is even possible or practical.
• New connected devices: Systems that may have been designed with the intention
to  be  entirely  isolated  may,  at  a  later  stage,  get  connected  to  other  systems.
Connectivity comes with strong security requirements but it is not always that clear if
it is not dealt during the design phase.
Several non-technical challenges that can affect the security design of an IoT system can
also be identified:
• New players:  Companies  entering  the  IoT  market  may  not  have  experience  in
dealing with security issues. They are traditional consumer-goods makers rather than
computer  hardware  or  software  firms.  For  example,  vehicle  OEMs that  are  now
including remote control capabilities to a car. The engineers involved may therefore
be relatively  inexperienced with  data-security issues,  and the firms involved may
place insufficient priority on security concerns.
• Security  as  a  commodity:  Security  is  sometimes  seen  as  a  commodity  or
something that can be added afterwards (bolt-in). At a first sight, security does not
have a direct value in return of investment. But taking security into account during the
whole system design (built-in) does reduce the likelihood of future security issues at
a lower cost than remediation after them.
For all of these reasons, it is not possible to simply use the same security features as are
used in desktop computers to the Internet of Things.
3.3. Security life cycle
The life cycle of a device refers to the operational phases of the device in the context of a
given application or use case. A generic life cycle applicable to very different IoT applications
and scenarios can be defined, as shown in Figure 3.1.
The life cycle of an IoT device starts when it is manufactured. The device is later installed
and commissioned within an IoT network during the bootstrapping phase. Specifically, the
device identity and the secret keys used during normal operation are provided to the device
Figure 3.1: Security life cycle for an IoT device
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during this phase. After being bootstrapped, the device and the IoT system are in operational
mode and execute the functions they are intended to.
For devices that will  operate during lifetimes spanning several years, they will  eventually
require maintenance cycles. During each maintenance, the software on the device can be
upgraded  or  reconfigured.  The  maintenance  tasks  can  be  performed  either  locally  or
centralized from a backend system. Depending on the changes, it may be required to re-
bootstrap at the end of a maintenance cycle.
It  has  to  be  noted  that  incorporating  a  mechanism  to  upgrade  the  software  to  fix
vulnerabilities  or  to  update  configuration  settings  as  well  as  adding  new functionality  is
recommended but there are also security challenges when using software updates.
The  device  continues  to  loop  through  the  operational  phase  until  the  device  is
decommissioned at the end of its life cycle. The end-of-life of a device does not necessarily
mean that it is defective but rather denotes a need to replace the device by next-generation
devices in order to provide additional functionality.
The device can be removed and re-commissioned to be used in a different IoT system and
start  the life cycle all  over again. When decommissioned, some actions like to reset the
device to factory settings or to update the security parameters of the left IoT system are
carried out in order to maintain the level of security.
3.4. Adversary capabilities
Adversary capabilities can be categorized as technical and operational capabilities.
• Technical capabilities: It refers to the assumptions concerning what an adversary
knows and his ability to analyze the target system. For example, it can be assumed
that the adversary has an instance of the target system and the capability to reverse
engineering  it  (or  purchase  this  knowledge)  and  the  appropriate  tools  to
communicate to the system.
• Operational capabilities: It refers to the assumptions concerning what an adversary
requires to deliver malicious input through a particular access interface in the field.
It is roughly divided in three categories:
− Physical access: Some of the devices used in the IoT may be physically
accessible  to  a  motivated  adversary.  Physical  access  to  IoT  devices
introduces a wide range of additional attack possibilities. In some cases it may
be possible  to  extract  keys  contained  on  chip.  This  can  be  accomplished
using power analysis, or fault injection (glitching) attacks. Tools for physical
attacks decrease in cost and become easier to use.
− Short-range  access: This  adversary  can  take  advantage  of  their  spatial
proximity  to  an  IoT  device  to  attack  the  device.  An  example  can  be  an
adversary in the range to be able to sniff  a specific device’s bootstrapping
communication. This category also includes an adversary connected to a LAN
that is part of the IoT system. As the main purpose of the network in IoT is to
transmit the collected data, most of the attacks focus on the impact of the
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availability of network resources. Also, most devices in IoT are connected into
IoT networks via wireless communication links.
− Long-range  access: This  adversary  can  take  advantage  of  long-range
communication network to interact with the IoT system (e.g. LoRaWAN, LTE).
Long-range access also includes an adversary interacting with the IoT system
through the Internet.
An attack can be performed from the network itself or from the Internet, and it  might be
applicable to a single device, some devices or all devices. For example, if an attack requires
physical access to a specific device then it is deemed to affect only one device at a time. An
attack to obtain a group key can affect multiple devices at one. Finally, an attack to obtain a
master network key might affect the whole system.
An attack can be unnoticeable to the user or may result in an observable result (e.g., door
opens or vehicle stops).
3.5. Security goals
For any system that deals with sensitive data, several security goals can be defined to model
the security properties needed for the system. The classic goals for information security are
Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability. The following additional goals will be considered for
IoT: Authentication, Freshness and Authorization. It  is interesting to know how a network
cannot accept messages that are not authentic (e.g. coming from an authorized party), that
are  not  fresh (e.g.  replay attacks)  and how is  a  device  authorized  to  participate  in  the
network.
For each considered security goal,  its related threats and security recommendations are
identified.
3.5.1. Confidentiality
Confidentiality is the property that data is not disclosed to entities unless they have been
authorized to know the data.
Confidentiality is an important service for the IoT since some of its applications manage
sensitive or critical information (e.g. Personal Identification Information, medical records or
vehicle positioning). It becomes more relevant by the fact that most of the IoT networks have
a wireless nature, where messages can be easily sniffed.
Confidentiality is commonly achieved by the use of cryptographic encryption where only the
entities in possession of the cryptographic key are able to understand the protected data.
3.5.1.1. Threats
Several threats to data confidentiality can be defined:
• Device capturing: The adversary with physical access to the device may capture
and control  it  by physically  replacing  the whole  device  or  by tampering with  the
hardware of the device. If a deployed device is captured, some sensitive information
(e.g. network key, firmware) may be obtained or altered by physical means. 
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• Physical  access:  An  adversary  may  attempt  to  extract  private  information  like
firmware,  keys,  user  data or  manufacturer’s  IP by having physical  access to the
device’s  hardware.  If  there  is  available  debugging  ports  (e.g.,  JTAG)  or  external
memories,  it  enables  him  to  dump  the  private  data.  Access  to  debugging  ports
enables the dynamic analysis of the firmware execution on the device dramatically
increasing the chance to find vulnerabilities that  can be exploited in  other similar
devices. 
• Eavesdropping:  Eavesdropping  is  the  process  of  gathering  information  from  a
network by snooping on transmitted data. It  consists in passive wiretapping done
secretly (e.g., without the knowledge of the originator or the intended recipients of the
communication). It is easier to perform on wireless networks since an adversary can
passively listen to the communication frequency from a safe distance.
Communication  may be eavesdropped upon if  the communication channel  is  not
sufficiently protected or in the event of session key compromise due to a long period
of usage without key renewal or updates.
It is especially important during the commissioning of a device into a network, it may
be susceptible to eavesdropping, especially if operational keying materials, security
parameters,  or  configuration  settings,  are  exchanged  in  clear  using  a  wireless
medium  or  if  used  cryptographic  algorithms  are  not  suitable  for  the  envisioned
lifetime of the device and the system.
Advanced attacks like Man In The Middle (MitM) also apply to enable eavesdropping
the network communication.
• Sniffing /  Traffic analysis:  Even if  the protected data cannot be interpreted, the
other  non-protected  fields  in  the  communication  exchange  can  be  useful  to  an
adversary. For example, the MAC header fields can be used to map all the devices in
a network. Other factors, like time, power or direction of the transmission may be
useful to track devices or to narrow down the position of every device in the network.
• Bootstrapping attack: The objective of this attack is to force a device to become
unassociated from the network. The next time the device tries to rejoin the network,
the adversary either passively eavesdrops on the association process in order to
collect  valuable  bootstrapping  information  that  it  can  use  to  perform  its  own
association  with  the  network,  or  the  adversary  can  perform  a  man-in-the-middle
attack in order to intervene with and thus prevent the association of the legitimate
device.
3.5.1.2. Security requirements
In order to counter the threats to data confidentiality, the following security requirements can
be defined:
• Physical protections: Device capturing detection can be accomplished by physical
security or by incorporating motion detectors for static devices. Another option is to
implement a keep-alive signal detection that will make the device to lock when the
signal is not sensed.
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• Anti-dump: There exist various ways of securing the physical layer such as epoxying
the chips, disabling debugging interfaces for production versions, the usage of ball
sockets (so the memory cannot be removed and dumped), and adding a tamper-
sensor that triggers a secret erasure process. The degree of success is variable in
providing resistance against an adversary.
• Data Encryption: Data should be encrypted in order that only authorized parties can
access it. Especially before transmitting over a link and when stored. If the use of
encryption is optional, it  should be enabled by default.  It  is also recommended to
apply several layers of security to avoid total confidentiality loss in case one of the
layers is compromised. For example, encryption on the MAC and Application layers. 
• Key management: Long-term keys usage should be avoided and the keys should be
changed periodically. The compromise of a long-term key has a bigger impact on the
confidentiality of the system than the usage of session keys. 
• Robust cryptography: Robust and tested cryptographic algorithms should be used.
For example, SHA2 as a hash algorithm, AES for symmetric cryptography and RSA
or ECC for the asymmetric one. The cipher block chaining mode should be taken into
account too. For instance, Electronic CodeBook (ECB) mode is not recommended
since identical plaintext blocks (under the same key) result in identical ciphertext [30].
Furthermore, since ciphertext blocks are independent, malicious substitution of ECB
blocks does not affect the decryption of adjacent blocks. 
• Key length: Up-to-date key length recommendations should be met to make brute-
force attack infeasible. For example, usage of 128-bits key for AES, 2048-bits keys
for RSA and 256-bits key for ECC.
• Secure bootstrapping: The security material that will be used to participate in the
network should be delivered in a secure way. For example, the use of asymmetric
cryptography,  secure  key  exchange  protocols  or  out-of-band  bootstrapping
procedure.
3.5.2. Integrity
Data integrity  is  the property that  data  has not  been changed,  destroyed,  or  lost  in  an
intended or unintended manner. Integrity is a ground base to trust data value. An integrity
service ensures that changes to the data are detectable. There are integrity services that
might also attempt to correct and recover from changes. 
Integrity is an important service for the IoT since if IoT applications receive forged data or
tampered  data,  erroneous  operation  status  can  be  estimated  and  wrong  feedback
commands can be made, which could further disrupt the operation of IoT applications. For
instance,  applications  that  depends  on  the  correct  reception  of  a  message  to  have  an
actuation  in  the  physical  world  (e.g.  vehicle  braking,  door  unlock  or  increase  insulin
pumping).
Integrity is commonly achieved by the use of digest algorithms, error detection or correction
codes. Normally, integrity is combined with authentication in order to provide verification that
the data was not changed and was sent by an authorized entity by the use of Messages
Authentication Codes.
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3.5.2.1. Threats
Several threats to data integrity can be defined:
• Message Manipulation: Message manipulation are used to inject false data into the
network by transforming a legitimate data frame into a modified frame containing
information of the adversary’s choice. For instance, in the wireless communications,
it can be based on emitting RF waves whose phase and amplitude are synchronized
with those of the original at the correct time, which leads to a new signal containing
the falsely injected data.
Advanced  attacks  like  Man  in  the  Middle  also  applies  to  enable  message
manipulation.
Message manipulation can also be used by an adversary to selectively modify some
data on a legitimate message in order to be dropped by the integrity mechanism at
the receiver, threatening the message availability.
• Sinkhole:  In  mesh  networks  or  networks  with  redundant  paths  some  kind  of
arbitration is enforced in order to choose the better path. Sinkhole attack (or black
hole attack), is the attack where an attacker declares himself to have a high-quality
route/path to the base station, thus allowing him to manipulate all packets passing
through it.
3.5.2.2. Security requirements
In order to counter the threats to data integrity, the following security requirements can be
defined:
• Data Integrity  mechanism:  The use of  integrity  checking mechanism like  CRC,
Message Integrity Codes (MIC) or digital signatures will enable the receiving entity to
check  if  the  integrity  of  the  message  is  correct.  It  has  to  be  noted  that  non-
cryptographic  mechanisms  like  CRC  does  not  prevent  data  modification  by  an
adversary able to modify the value of both the data and the CRC.
The Key Management, Robust Cryptography and Key, and Key Length, presented in
Section 3.5.1.2, also apply here in order to provide a robust data integrity checking
mechanism
• Secure routing protocol: Dynamic routing must be designed in a way that a single
device cannot make the network to send all the traffic to it. For example, there are
routing protocols that uses neighborhood information of all the devices in the network
to map the network devices, hence any inconsistency may be detected in this kind of
protocol.
3.5.3. Authentication
Authentication is the process of verifying a claim that a system entity or data has a certain
attribute value.  Authenticated entities and data are legitimate.  An authentication  process
consists in presenting the claimed attribute value (e.g. identity) and some evidence to prove
the binding between the attribute and that for which it is claimed (e.g. value signed with a
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private key). It is used to verify the presence and identity of a person, device or service at
the time and to verify the source of data.
Authentication  is  important  to  the  IoT  to  ensure  that  non-authenticated  devices  or
applications cannot connect to the IoT network and to ensure that the devices and data
delivered in an IoT are legitimate. Since the IoT is formed by a large number of diverse
objects and that most of them are operated without human interaction, authentication is a
challenging process.
This aspect, which requires to identify the communication endpoints, is particularly relevant
in those scenarios where it is necessary to ensure that private data cannot be accessed by
unknown or unauthorized parties.
Authorizing  a  device  within  IoT  have  some  challenges  that  does  not  exist  in  desktop
computing, where the concept of a user with different user-names and passwords will be
entered into the service a user wishes to use. In IoT, the user is not actively using the device
through an advanced user interface.
3.5.3.1. Threats
Several threats to authentication can be defined:
• Message injection: Message injection are used to inject data into the network. An
adversary may try to inject illegitimate messages to the network in order to execute
non-authenticated actions.
• Spoofing: Spoofing is a means to hide one's true identity on the network. To create a
spoofed identity, an attacker uses a fake source address that does not represent the
actual address of the packet. Spoofing may be used to hide the original source of an
attack or to work around network Access Control Lists (ACLs) that are in place to limit
host access based on source address rules.
• Sybil attack:  Sybil attack, whereby an attacker presents multiple identities to other
devices in the network is similar to Spoofing but tries to exploit the fact that normally
a single identity is associated to each device in the network.
3.5.3.2. Security requirements
In order to counter the threat to authentication, the following security requirements can be
defined:
• Authentication  mechanism:  An  authentication  mechanisms  like  Message
Authentication  Codes  or  digital  signatures  should  be  used.  For  the  Message
Authentication Code case, it is recommended that the symmetric key is unique per
device to avoid authenticating different devices with the same credentials.
3.5.4. Freshness
Freshness or data liveness is a property of a communication association or a feature of a
communication protocol that provides assurance to the recipient of  data that  the data is
being freshly transmitted by its originator (e.g., that the data is not being replayed, by either
the originator or a third party, from a previous transmission).
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Data liveness is typically achieved by the inclusion of a random nonce or a non-repeating
value in the data exchanged by the protocol.
3.5.4.1. Threats
The main threat to freshness can be defined as:
• Replay  attack:  An  attack  in  which  a  valid  data  transmission  is  maliciously  or
fraudulently repeated, either by the originator or by a third party who intercepts the
data and re-transmits it. Replay attacks may be used to bypass and authentication
control by repeating the messages of a previous legitimate authentication. It can be
used to induce a previous observed state change or action within the network.
3.5.4.2. Security requirements
In order to counter the threat to freshness, the following security requirement can be defined:
• Use of nonces: A nonce is a random or non-repeating value that is included in data
exchanged by a protocol, usually for the purpose of guaranteeing liveness and thus
detecting and protecting against replay attacks.
3.5.5. Availability
Availability is the property of a system or data being accessible, or usable or operational
upon demand by an authorized entity.  It  is  especially important in critical  systems which
requires to timely receive messages in order to operate in a safely manner. 
3.5.5.1. Threats
There is a main threat to the availability that can be identified:
• Denial of Service: This attack focuses on rendering a device as not available by
exhausting its resources or blocking access to physical resources such as wireless
medium. An adversary can continuously send requests to be processed by specific
things so as to deplete their resources. This is especially dangerous in the IoT since
typically the devices tend to have tight memory and limited computation resources.
Several techniques have been used to achieve this result:
− Radio Jamming:  Radio jamming is  a physical  layer  attack with the intend of
creating  a  DoS  on  the  network  links.  It  consists  in  the  emission  of  high
transmission power radio signals in order to disrupt the reception of messages at
network devices. 
The jamming can be over all the channels of the frequency band or targeting only
a single channel rather than all the channels. It can be continuously transmitted
or started when it senses ongoing network activity.
Jamming can also be performed on upper network layers. It consists in emitting
packets of  useless content  at  specific  or  random moments.  Its objective is  to
affect the correct execution of protocols. Jamming attack can be used as a step
for further attacks like delayed message or man-in-the-middle attacks.
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− Device-specific flooding: Flooding attempts to cause a failure in a system by
providing more input than the system can process properly. A simple PC may be
able  to  flood  some  of  the  IoT  devices  since  they  are  resource-constrained
devices.
− Channel  reservation  abuse:  Data  link  layer  that  uses  channel  reservation
mechanisms like CSMA-CA may be abused by an adversary to hijack the channel
access or to jam it without needing to transmit at a high duty cycle. For example,
CSMA-CA short  back-off  time used by an adversary will  make  the legitimate
devices  to increase its  own back-off  time and power  consumption during the
reception of the adversary’s data. Another example may be transmitting a frame
with empty payload but with a big frame duration value.
− Wormhole:  Wormhole  attack,  where  an  attacker  may  record  packets  at  one
location in the network and tunnel them to another distant location. This creates
the  perception  that  two  distant  nodes  are  very  close  to  each  other,  greatly
impacting the functionality of routing. The tunnel is either a wired link or a high
frequency  link.  The  effects  of  the  attack  may  serve  an  adversary  to  routing
disruption or selectively drop data packets.
− Sleep deprivation attack: One of the solutions to enable an extended lifetime for
battery powered devices is to remain most of the time asleep and only wake up
when  necessary.  In  these  situation,  the  so-called  Sleep  deprivation  attacks
applies. It tries to break the sleep routines and keep the device awake all the time
until they are shut down.
3.5.5.2. Security requirements
In  order  to  counter  the  threat  to  availability,  the  following  security  requirements  can be
defined:
• DoS detection:  DoS  attacks  are  difficult  to  defend,  especially  in  a  system with
resource-constrained devices. On the other hand, they are normally easy to detect,
for instance, jamming attacks can be detected by sensing the channel with a radio
monitoring equipment and a policy that detects not normal communications. Once
the attack is detected several actions can be performed, like route the messages
through a different network path or even try to physically locate the jamming source.
• Use  of  Multiple  channels:  The  usage  of  multiple  channels  make  the  potential
jamming to be costlier since it has to cover more frequency channels. The channel
can  be  proactively  changed  after  a  certain  duration  of  time  (e.g.,  with  channel
hopping) or upon the attack detection.
• Flooding resistance: A device should be designed to gracefully tolerate excessive
numbers  of  unauthenticated  messages.  It  means  to  have  spare  resources  for
communications functionality or  a degraded mode of operation that maintains the
system in an operative state.
• Multi-path / Mesh networks: Sending the same message through several different
paths  may  diminish  the  impact  of  DoS  attack.  Mesh  networks  may  implement
redundant paths to the same destination and use one or the other or both at the
same time.
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3.5.6. Authorization
Authorization is an approval that is granted to an entity to access a system resource. An
authenticated user  may be  authorized to  access  some resources (e.g.  service  user  vs,
service administrator).
This aspect, which requires to identify the communication endpoints, is particularly relevant
in those scenarios where it is necessary to ensure that private data cannot be accessed by
unknown or unauthorized parties.
Authorizing  a  device  within  IoT  have  some  challenges  that  does  not  exist  in  desktop
computing, where the concept of a user with different user-names and passwords will be
entered into the service a user wishes to use. In IoT, the user is not actively using the device
through an advanced user interface.
Only authorized devices should be able to access the IoT network. Unauthorized devices
should not be able to route their messages over the IoT network, because it may access
sensitive data or exhaust resources needed for correct network operation.
3.5.6.1. Threats
Several threats to authorization can be defined:
• Unauthorized commands: Some systems may accept a set of commands without
authorization. A malicious use of these commands may be exploited to get access to
the network resources. It especially happens before a trust relationship have been
established (e.g. before device commissioning).
• Misplaced trust: Some systems trust a device if they are, for instance, in the same
network (e.g. LAN, WiFi AP) or if its data link layer address lays in a certain range.
• Attacks  on  no/weak  device  commissioning:  Default  or  weak  credentials  used
during device commissioning to the network may be exploited to gain access to the
network  by  unauthorized  devices.  Weak  credentials,  not  carefully  chosen  (e.g.
randomly), are vulnerable to be compromised by brute forcing all its possible values.
3.5.6.2. Security requirements
In order to counter the threat to authorization, the following security requirements can be
defined:
• Reduced  set  of  unauthorized  commands:  It  is  recommended  that  the  only
unauthorized commands are the ones dedicated to trust establishment (e.g. device
commissioning, key exchange handshake).
• Per-device  unique  authentication  credentials:  It  is  recommended  to  not  use
default passwords shared between devices, or weak out of the box passwords. All
passwords  should  be  randomly  created  using  high  quality  random  number
generators. 
• Resistance to brute force attacks:  Authentication mechanism should be designed
to make attacks like brute-force authentication attacks, dictionary attacks infeasible,
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as well  as other  attacks that  involve exhaustive searching of  the device’s  key or
password space.
• Secure device commissioning: Device commissioning procedure is the first step on
network access control. It is where a trust relationship between the network and the
joining  device  is  established.  It  is  recommended  that  each  device  that  requires
authentication  should  be  instantiated  either  prior  to  shipping,  or  on  initial
configuration by the user, with credentials unique to that device.
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4. Security survey on networking technologies
This chapter surveys the security of the state of the art networking technologies enabling the
Internet  of  Things.  A set  of  representative  networking technologies  have been surveyed
describing their security options and listing the issues found in research studies and security
conferences. The analysis is purely theoretical, based on published information.
4.1. Ethernet
Ethernet  is  the  most  used  MAC  layer  protocol  in  the  computer  networks.  Originally
conceived as  a  simple,  inexpensive  local-area network  (LAN)  technology,  it’s  now used
throughout most of the wide-area networks (WANs) for carrying the Internet traffic.
It  is a family of computer networking technologies. It  was standardized in 1983 as IEEE
802.3. The most common used physical medium by Ethernet is a copper twisted pair or fiber
optic links.
There  are  several  refinements  to  the  standard  supporting  higher  bit  rates  and  longer
distances. There exist commercial repeaters or switches to enhance the distance range.
The need of a wire for every device connection makes the network static and costly to be
modified. The cost of a wire to connect every device can be considered high compared to
wireless solutions. 
Ethernet only manages until the MAC layer, but it is able to carry a payload of 1500 bytes. It
can play a role on the LAN and WAN part of the IoT systems and for critical systems that
have strict requirements on latency and bandwidth.
4.1.1. Security options
Security Goal Ethernet (802.3) 802.1X + 802.1AE
Confidentiality No
AES-128 GCMIntegrity CRC
Authentication No
Freshness No Packet Number in the MIC
Availability Wired media 
Authorization By physical connection EAP-TLS with TLS v1.2
Key type Not applicable
Session key
MACSec key
Key management Not applicable Periodic re-authentication 
Required power moderate high
Table 4.1: Ethernet security options summary
Ethernet does not offer any specific security mechanism. On the other hand, its big payload
is able to carry any of the full-fledged IP-based security network and transport protocols.
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Mechanisms such  as  MAC filtering  to  implement  access  control  using the MAC source
addresses  or  the  Virtual  LAN  (VLAN)  to  divide  the  broadcasting  domains  are  easily
bypassed using spoofing techniques.
Note that while the CRC provides some integrity protection, it is not considered to provide
cryptographic integrity as it can be easily forged.
802.1X
The IEEE 802.1X standard [31] defines the port-based network access control that is used to
provide  authenticated  wired  access  to  Ethernet  networks.  It  specifies  an  architecture,
functional elements, and protocols that support mutual authentication between the clients of
ports attached to the same LAN and secure communication between the ports. Access to the
port can be denied if the authentication process fails. 
It defines two basic components:
• Supplicant: An entity at one end of a point-to-point LAN segment that seeks to be
authenticated by an Authenticator attached to the other end of that link.
• Authenticator: The Authenticator is a network device, normally a managed switch
featuring access control whereby a port will remain in an “unauthorized” state (not
allowing access) prior to authentication occurring, and the port will be changed to an
“authorized” state (allowing access) after successful authentication occurs. Network
connections can also be configured to time out and then force re-authentication for
any new connections.
And a third optional component:
• Authentication  Server:  The  authentication  server  (typically  a  RADIUS  server)
validates  the  credentials  of  the  supplicant  requesting  access.  Credentials  might
include username/password, digital certificate or other methods.
IEEE 802.1X defines the encapsulation of the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [32]
which is known as "EAP over LAN" or EAPOL. It allows a number of different authentication
methods to be used including the use of Public Key Encryption and One Time Passwords.
802.1X mandates the use of EAP-TLS [33]. At the end of a successful EAP-TLS handshake,
a Master Session Key (MSK) is derived in both ends.
Periodic re-authentication can be configured, being 1 hour the default value.
It defines applications of port-based network access that use IEEE 802.1AE. It supports the
derivation of key material from the EAP MSK and key distribution to enable the 802.1AE
operation.
802.1AE
The IEEE 802.1AE standard [34] defines a Layer 2 security protocol called Medium Access
Control Security (MACsec) that provides point-to-point security on Ethernet links between
nodes for securing a wired LAN. Once MACsec is enabled on a point-to-point Ethernet link,
all  traffic  traversing  the link  is  secured through the use  of  data  integrity  checks  and,  if
configured, encryption.
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MACsec uses AES-128 in Galois  Counter  Mode (GCM) as the authenticated encryption
algorithm.
It adds a security field to the Ethernet frame with information needed for MACsec operation
including a 4 bytes Packet Number for replay protection. This field, along with the encrypted
payload, will be included in the integrity checking that is added at the end of the Ethernet
frame.
4.1.2. Issues
The primary weakness with Ethernet is that it is a broadcast system. Every message sent
out by any computer on a segment of Ethernet wiring reaches all parts of that segment and
potentially could be read by any computer on the segment.
It is a great advantage to be able to install and expand a LAN just by connecting switches
and computers together with cabling and have it work automatically. However, the features
that enable this, like MAC table learning and ARP together with the underlying broadcasting
mechanism, are also key vulnerabilities.
• Unauthorized joins: The basis for attacks is gaining access to the target Ethernet
segment. The attacker may, for example, be an insider with full access rights, may
have found an Ethernet connection in a public space, or may have taken control of a
workstation in the LAN. Then, it is easy to eavesdrop all the traffic in the link.
• Switch control: An adversary can use the MAC learning table and ARP mechanisms
to make the target switch forward frames destined for a remote host to the network
adversary.  It  can  be  achieved  by  repeatedly  sending  frames  spoofing  the  MAC
address of the remote host.
• MAC learning table  exhaustion:  An  adversary  render  the  switch  inoperable  by
sending lots of frames with random MAC addresses to fill the MAC learning dynamic
table. It is possible that from that point the switch work in hub mode repeating all the
received frames to all the ports.
• VLAN Tagging and Hopping: An attacker can create Ethernet frames that have a
VLAN tag and thus inject frames to VLANs to which they are not supposed to have
access.
4.2. Power Line Communication (PLC)
Power line communication, that is, using the electricity infrastructure for data transmission, is
experiencing a renaissance in the context of Smart Grid. It is used for remote meter reading.
The basic principle in transmitting data through Power Line Communication (PLC) consists
in superimposing a high frequency signal that is message signal (1.6 to 30 MHz) at low
energy levels over the 50 Hz electrical signal like the one usually found at home. It is able to
carry from 500kbps to 135Mbps, depending on the quality of the wires. 
It has an easy and low cost deployment because of exploitation of the existing wires. The
devices have an Ethernet MAC address and can be connected to a computer or Ethernet
compatible network device like a switch or router.
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The most used existing standards for PLC is the HomePlug AV. This standard has been
produced by HomePlug Powerline Alliance [35]. It offers a peak data rate of 200 Mbps at the
physical layer, and about 80 Mbps at the MAC layer.
4.2.1. Security options
Security Goal PLC
Confidentiality AES-128 CBC
Integrity
CRC-32 in the encrypted payload
Authentication
Freshness Nonces
Availability Wired media
Authorization By physical connection, custom key agreementor user provided credentials
Key type Network membership, encryption, device accessand temporary encryption keys
Key management Key is changed and securely distributedperiodically
Required power low
Table 4.2: PLC security options summary
HomePlug AV security was studied in  [36]. It includes key distribution techniques and the
use  of  AES-128 encryption.  Older  HomePlug  AV  versions  use  the  less  secure  DES
protocols.
Four types of keys are used in HomePlug AV:
• Network Membership Keys: which enable a device to authenticate to the network. It
can be pre-installed, obtained protected with the Device Access key or by the key
exchange protocol.
• Network Encryption  Keys:  which  enable  a  device  to  perform the cryptographic
processing needed to exchange data with another device within the same network.
Figure 4.1: PLC topology
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• Device Access Keys: which are unique to a device and allow other devices to pass
it the Network Membership keys securely. It is derived from a password chosen at
random by the manufacturer and usually printed on the back of the device.
• Temporary Encryption Keys: which are generated and used in the key distribution
protocols.
To form a network, the Network Membership key is distributed to all the devices. Using this
key,  the coordinator  distributes  a  periodically  changing Network  Encryption  Key to each
device in the network. Nonces are used to prevent replay attacks. There are four ways to
join a new device to the network:
• The user plugs devices into the outlets and they connect by themselves.
• The user enters a network password to get a device to join a network (devices with
rich user interfaces).
• The user enters a device password to add another device to its network (at least one
device with rich user interface).
• The user pushes a button on each of two devices to get them to connect to each
other.
4.2.2. Issues
• Emissions:  Twisted and protected cables  are  not  used for  power  lines.  For  this
reason, the electromagnetic emissions produced by power lines can be received by
radio receivers and may be used on an eavesdropping attack.
• Default password: Encryption key is normally based on a default password defined
by the manufacturer. Most of the user won’t change that value.
• Low entropy keys:  Keys are derived from passwords or even the device’s MAC
address.
• Non-controlled range: The assumption that the perimeter of the house is a barrier.
Power line may cross the perimeter of a house if, for instance, a plug is available on
the outside or it is a building with a shared power feed. The signal can travel quite far
down wires, and despite fuse boxes offering some resistance to signals, it is usually
found that the signal is retrievable in the neighbor's house.
4.3. Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID)
A basic Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) system consists of an RFID reader and RFID
tags.  It’s  main  role  in  the  IoT  is  to  provide  identification  services.  RFID  uses  wireless
technologies such as ISO/IEC 14443.
42 Security Issues in Internet of Things
An RFID system consists of two components: a transponder and a reader:
• The transponder: Also known as a tag, acts as the actual data carrier. It is applied to
an object (e.g. on a good or package) or integrated into an object (e.g. in a smart
card)  and  can  be  read  without  making  contact,  and  rewritten  depending  on  the
technology used. Basically,  the transponder consists of an integrated circuit and a
radio-frequency module. An identification number is stored along with other data on
the transponder and the object with which it is connected. Two types of tags can be
defined:
− Active tags: Requires a power source like powered infrastructure or battery. One
example  is  the  transponder  attached  to  an  aircraft  that  identifies  its  national
origin.
− Passive tags: Does not require batteries or maintenance. They are powered by
the reader’s RF field and are small enough to fit into an adhesive label.
• The reading unit: it consists of a reading, in some cases a write/read, unit and an
antenna. The reader reads data from the transponder and in some cases, it instructs
the transponder to store further data. 
4.3.1. Security options
Security Goal RFID
Confidentiality No
Integrity CRC-16
Authentication No
Freshness No
Availability No
Authorization By physical proximity
Key type Not applicable
Key management Not applicable
Required power low
Table 4.3: RFID security options summary
RFID  does  not  offer  any  specific  security  mechanism  other  than  the  CRC  for  integrity
checking. Note that it is not considered to provide cryptographic integrity as it can be easily
forged.
Figure 4.2: RFID topology
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Some  sort  of  confidentiality  and  Authentication  can  be  provided  if  the  stored  data  is
encrypted and includes an authentication mechanism like MAC or digital signature. Newer
tags have security functionality built into the chip but are not a part of the specification. 
In a second generation, a Kill command was included. Tags can be “killed” or permanently
rendered inoperable by command under the Generation 2 protocol.
4.3.2. Issues
RFID tags are considered simple devices that can only listen and respond, no matter who
sends the request signal. This brings up risks of unauthorized access and modification of tag
data.  In other words, unprotected tags may be vulnerable to eavesdropping,  spoofing or
denial of service attacks [37].
• Eavesdropping:  Radio  signals  transmitted from the tag,  and the reader,  can be
detected several meters away by other radio receivers. It is possible therefore for an
unauthorized user to gain access to the data contained in RFID tags if  legitimate
transmissions are not properly protected.
• Spoofing:  By  spoofing  valid  tags,  the  intruder  could  fool  an  RFID  system,  and
change the identity of tags to gain an unauthorized or undetected advantage.
• Denial of Service: DoS is possible using radio Jamming techniques, by the use of a
“blocker tag” that simulates many tags simultaneously flooding the  legitimate RFID
reads or by corrupting a large batch of tags. Or by killing the tag with Kill command.
• Unauthorized Access to Tags: A rogue reader can read a tag, recording information
that may be confidential. It can also write new, potentially damaging information to
the tag. Or it can kill the tag. In each of these cases, the tags respond as if the RFID
reader was authorized, since the rogue reader appears like any other RFID reader.
• Unauthorized tracking:  Even if  tag data is protected, it  is  possible to use traffic
analysis tools to track predictable tag responses over time. Correlating and analyzing
the  data  could  build  a  picture  of  movement,  social  interactions  and  financial
transactions.
4.4. Near Field Communication (NFC)
Near  Field  Communication  (NFC)  is  a  set  of  short-range  communication  technologies,
operating over electromagnetic fields at a frequency of 13.56MHz over distances of about 10
cm.  NFC specifications  are  developed by the NFC Forum,  an association  composed of
companies with interest in NFC. NFC was approved as the ISO/IEC 18092 [38].
NFC operation is described in standards ISO/IEC 14443 and ISO/IEC 18092. NFC is used to
read and write information stored in tags. For example, Temperature and humidity sensors
readings on transported consumer goods.
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As  can  be  seen  in  Figure  4.3,  the  main  characteristic  of  NFC  is  that  it  is  a  wireless
communication interface with a working distance limited to about 10 cm. It is intended to
create a close proximity communication between two devices.
NFC  devices  communicate  by  generating  electromagnetic  fields.  In  an  active
communication, both devices generate their own fields. In a passive communication, one
device transmits data by modulating the field generated by the active device.
It was also chosen as the principal communications protocol for mobile payments since most
of the mobile devices were NFC enabled devices. ISO/IEC 14443 is the same standard used
for contactless payment cards.
4.4.1. Security options
Security Goal NFC NFC-SEC
Confidentiality No AES-128 CTR
Integrity CRC-16 AES-XCBC-MAC-96
or
AES-128 GCMAuthentication No
Freshness No Sequence number in theMIC
Availability No No
Authorization By physical proximity ECDH 192-bits
Key type Not applicable
Exchanged key
Confidentiality key
Integrity key
Key management Not applicable New key agreed on eachconnection
Required power low low
Table 4.4: NFC security options summary
Physical features of the NFC radio signal offer some security like short-range and direction
of signals. In other words, it is assumed that user is able to notice if the attacker participates
to  the  communication.  Note  that  CRC  integrity  checking  is  not  considered  to  provide
cryptographic integrity as it can be easily forged.
Just like RFID, some sort of confidentiality and Authentication can be provided if the stored
data is encrypted and includes an authentication mechanism like MAC or digital signature.
Figure 4.3: NFC topology
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Newer  tags  have  security  functionality  built  into  the  chip  but  are  not  a  part  of  the
specification. If applications require security, it needs to be implemented at higher levels.
NFC-SEC
ECMA-385 NFC-SEC [39] specifies two security services and protocols over the NFC:
• Shared Secret Services: It establishes a shared secret key between the two peers,
which the application will use at its discretion. 
• Secure Channel Service: It provides the establishment of a link key by derivation of a
shared  secret  key  established  by  key  agreement  mechanism.  Subsequent
communication  will  be  protected  by  the  link  keys  in  either  direction  across  the
channel.
The services will use a NFC-SEC cryptography part that defines the cryptographic algorithm
to be used during security services.
ECMA-386 NFC-SEC-01 [40] is a security part that specifies the use of ECDH with a 192-bit
key for the key agreement and the AES-128 for the secure channel. From the exchanged
key, a key for encryption and a key for integrity are derived. AES-128 in CTR mode is used
for confidentiality and AES-XCBC-MAC-96 for the integrity. AES-XCBC-MAC-96 is the AES-
XCBC-PRF-128 [41] truncated to 12 bytes. A sequence number is protected by the integrity
mechanism.
ECMA-409 NFC-SEC-02 [42] specifies similar security protections but using ECDH with 256-
bits  key  for  key  agreement  and  AES-128  in  GCM  mode  as  authenticated  encryption
algorithm.
4.4.2. Issues
Older NFC standards did not include any notion of communication security. This made NFC
exchanges vulnerable to eavesdropping, data modification, and data insertion [43]:
• Eavesdropping: It is possible since NFC is a wireless communication interface. The
adversary  needs  knowledge  on  how to  decode  the  sniffed  RF  signal.  10  cm  is
typically the maximum range, but it is possible to eavesdrop the communication from
1m to 10m (depending on the mode of operation) away from the target.
• Data corruption: It is possible by transmitting at the same time as a legitimate node.
On the  other  hand,  it  does  not  allow an  attacker  to  manipulate  the  actual  data
rendering this attack as a Denial of Service attack.
• Data manipulation: In data manipulation, the attacker wants the receiving node to
receive some valid but manipulated data. The feasibility of this attack highly depends
on the applied strength of the amplitude modulation. Furthermore, the attack is only
possible for some bits due to the values used on the encoding of the data. Short
operating distance and RF characteristics of NFC (“load modulation”) help keeping
risk low.
• Relay  attacks: It  can  be  used  two  transponders  in  order  to  relay  over  a  large
distance the information that a reader and a node exchange. A proxy-node is placed
near the reader and a proxy-reader is placed near the legitimate node.
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4.5. Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE)
Also known as Bluetooth Smart,  it  reduces energy consumption and device costs when
compared with classic Bluetooth. BLE is a technology introduced by the Bluetooth Special
Interest Group (SIG) in the 4.0 version of the Bluetooth protocol specification [44]. The last
version is the Bluetooth 4.2 [45].
The Bluetooth specification defines a complete communication stack for BLE composed of
the physical layer, the link layer, the Logical Link Control and Adaptation Protocol (L2CAP)
(not all of the L2CAP capabilities are available), which multiplexes the upper layer protocols,
the Attribute Protocol (ATT), which defines a way of discovering and transporting attributes
(values) and the Generic Attribute Profile (GATT), which defines a framework based on ATT
for  defining  services.  The  stack  is  split  between  the  Controller,  which  implements  the
physical  and  link  layers,  and  the  Host,  which  implements  the  upper  layers.  These  two
components communicate with each other using the standardized Host Controller Interface
(HCI).
BLE  like  the  classic  Bluetooth  operates  in  the  unlicensed  2.4  GHz  ISM band  but  it  is
designed for use cases and applications with lower data rates and has lower duty cycle. It
employs a frequency hopping transceiver to combat interference and fading. Two multiple
access schemes are defined: Frequency Division Multiple Access (FDMA) and Time Division
Multiple Access (TDMA). 40 physical channels, separated by 2 MHz, are used in the FDMA
scheme. 3 are used as advertising channels and 37 are used as data channels. A TDMA
based polling scheme is used in which one device transmits a packet at a predetermined
time and a corresponding device responds with a packet after a predetermined interval.
Only one device is the network master; all others being network slaves. All communication is
between the master and slave devices. There is no direct communication between slave
devices on the network.
Figure 4.4: BLE topology
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IPv6 over BLE
It is specified in the RFC 7668 [46]. It describes how IPv6 is transported over Bluetooth low
energy using 6LoWPAN techniques.
In BLE,  direct  wireless communication only takes place between a master and a slave.
Nevertheless,  two  slaves  may  communicate  through  the  master  by  using  IP  routing
functionality  per  the  RFC 7668  specification.  Using  the 6LoWPAN terminology,  the  BLE
master have the role of a 6LowPAN Border Router (6LBR) and the slaves have the role of
6LowPAN Node (6LN).
In a typical scenario, the BLE network is connected to the Internet through the 6LBR router.
In this scenario, the BLE star is deployed as one sub-net, using one /64 IPv6 prefix, with
each spoke representing an individual link. The 6LBR is acting as router and forwarding
packets between 6LNs and to and from Internet.
Bluetooth Mesh
During the redaction of this report, a new specification was published, Bluetooth Mesh [47].
Mesh networking improves reliability, redundancy, security, speed, and overall performance.
It uses a wireless ad-hoc architecture to connect servers and devices without requiring the
input  of  a  centralized  hub  or  router.  The points  creating  the  architecture,  called  nodes,
dynamically interact and reconfigure themselves based on available bandwidth, storage, and
network pathways.
4.5.1. Security options
BLE offers various security services for protecting the information exchange between two
connected devices. Most of the supported security services can be expressed in terms of
two mutually-exclusive security modes called LE Security Mode 1 and LE Security Mode 2.
These two modes provide security functionality  at  the  Link  Layer  and at  the  ATT layer,
respectively.
BLE  uses  AES-128  with  CCM  encryption  and  Message  Integrity  Check  (MIC).  When
encryption and authentication are used in a connection, a 4-byte Message Integrity Check
(MIC) is appended to the payload of the data channel PDU. Encryption is then applied to the
PDU payload and MIC fields. It is also possible to transmit authenticated data over a non
Figure 4.5: IP over BLE topology
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encrypted Link Layer connection. In this case, a 12-byte signature is placed after the data
payload at the ATT layer.
Security Goal BLE 4.0 / 4.1 BLE 4.2 Bluetooth Mesh
Confidentiality
AES-128
CCM
(4-byte MIC)
AES-128
CCM
(4 or 8 byte MIC)
Integrity
Authentication
Freshness Counter incremented on every signed PDU 24-bit sequence number
Availability Frequency hopping
Frequency hopping
Mesh network
Authorization Custom key exchangebased on AES-128
P-256 ECDH
HMAC-SHA-256 
Key type
Temporary key
Short term key
Long term key
Temporary key
Long term key
Device key
Network key
Application key
Key management Encryption key can be changed on application request
Required power very low low low
Table 4.5: Bluetooth security options summary
Each security mode accounts with different levels,  which express requirements as to the
type of pairing that has to be used.
Pairing mode Encryption Integrity Layer
Security Mode 1
Level 1 No No No
Link layerLevel 2 Unauthenticated Yes Yes
Level 3 Authenticated Yes Yes
Security Mode 2
Level 1 Unauthenticated No Yes
ATT layer
Level 2 Authenticated No Yes
Table 4.6: BLE security Modes and Levels
BLE version 4.0 and 4.1 uses a custom key exchange protocol unique to the BLE standard.
In this setup, the devices exchange a Temporary Key (TK) and use it to create a Short Term
Key (STK) which is used to encrypt the connection. How secure this process is depends
greatly on the pairing method used to exchange the TK. 
BLE version 4.2 upgraded BLE pairing to utilize P-256 elliptic curve cryptography in what are
known as LE Secure Connections. Instead of using a TK and STK, LE Secure Connections
use  a  single  Long  Term  Key  (LTK)  to  encrypt  the  connection.  This  LTK  is
exchanged/generated using Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) public key cryptography
which  offers  significantly  stronger  security  compared  to  the  original  BLE  key  exchange
protocol. It has to be noted that the ECDH is not offering protection against MitM attacks
since  no party  is  authenticated.  Numeric  comparison,  Out-of-Band  and  Passkey pairing
models gives a protection against this kind of attack.
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The value of the TK used for the key exchange is selected depending on the pairing model
used. BLE uses four pairing models:
• Just Works: The Just Works association model is primarily designed for scenarios
where at least one of the devices does not have a display capable of displaying a six-
digit number nor does it have a keyboard capable of entering six decimal digits. The
application may simply ask the user to accept the connection. 
• Passkey Entry: The Passkey Entry association model is primarily designed for the
scenario where one device has input capability but does not have the capability to
display six digits and the other device has output capabilities. The user is shown a
six-digit number (from "000000" to "999999") on the device with a display, and is then
asked to enter the number on the other device. If the value entered on the second
device is correct, the pairing is successful.
• Out-of-Band:  The Out-of-Band (OOB) association model is primarily designed for
scenarios where an Out-of-band mechanism is used to both discover the devices as
well as to exchange or transfer cryptographic numbers used in the pairing process. It
can be implemented with an out-of-band channel such as an NFC connection. The
main advantage to this method is that a very large TK can be used, up to 128 bits,
greatly enhancing the security of the connection.
• Numeric Comparison: Introduced in the BLE version 4.2, the Numeric Comparison
association  model  is  designed  for  scenarios  where  both  devices  are  capable  of
displaying a six-digit number and both are capable of having the user enter "yes" or
"no".  The user is  shown a six-digit  number  (from "000000" to "999999")  on both
displays and then asked whether the numbers are the same on both devices. If "yes"
is entered on both devices, the pairing is successful.
Bluetooth Mesh
All messages are encrypted and authenticated using two types of keys. One key type is for
the network layer communication, such that all communication within a mesh network would
use the same network key. The other key type is for application data. Separating the keys for
networking and applications allows sensitive access messages (e.g., for access control to a
building) to be separated from non-sensitive access messages (e.g., for lighting). There are
no non-encrypted or unauthenticated messages within a mesh network.
Three types of keys are defined:
• Device key: it facilitates confidentiality and authentication of key material between a
Provisioner and a single node.
• Application key:  it  facilitates confidentiality and authentication of application data
sent between intended nodes.
• Network  key:  it  facilitates  confidentiality,  and  authenticity  of  network  messages.
Shared among all of the network nodes.
A node may have knowledge of a single device key, multiple application keys, and multiple
network keys.
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To create a mesh network, a Provisioner is required. A Provisioner shall generate a network
key using a random number generator. The Provisioner can then provision these devices to
become nodes within the mesh network. Provisioning of the network key is based on the use
of the ECDH key exchange mechanism.
4.5.2. Issues
• Optional No security mode:  The end user can choose to configure the security
mode to No security or to use non-authenticated pairing modes.
• Legacy non-secure pairing modes:  In versions prior to the 4.2, Just Works and
Passkey modes are susceptible to be attacked by eavesdropping attacks.
• Legacy Passkey pairing method: In versions prior to the 4.2, there is at least one
theoretical  Man  in  the  Middle  attack  that  is  able  to  succeed  without  advanced
knowledge of the passkey as detailed in the article [48].
• Offline brute force on legacy pairing modes:  In versions prior  to the 4.2, it  is
possible to perform an offline brute force of  the confirm value for  every possible
Temporary Key between 0 and 999.999. If the master and slave used Just Works or
6-digit PIN, it is possible to quickly find the proper TK whose confirm matches the
value exchanged over the air [49].
• Just Works does not offer device authentication: This method offers no way of
verifying the devices taking part in the connection and thus it offers no Man in the
Middle attack protection.  This model  is the most  probably used by low-resources
devices  since  the  other  models  require  an user  interface or  an extra  method to
perform Out-of-band key exchange.
4.6. Wireless Fidelity (WiFi)
Wireless Fidelity (WiFi) is a widely used wireless local area network technology defined by
IEEE. It is defined by the IEEE 802.11 family of standards [50], with the first one introduced
in 1997. Most devices support the newer standards IEEE 802.11n and IEEE 802.11ac.
WiFi communications use frequency bands around 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz; devices operate on
frequency  ranges  centered  on  preset  channels  located  within  those  bands.  If  two  WiFi
network  channels  overlap,  interference  can  lead  to  lower  throughput  or  even  loss  of
connectivity.  Wireless  devices  often  support  dynamic  selection  of  channels.  The  IEEE
802.11 wireless networks operate in two basic modes: infrastructure and ad-hoc. 
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Infrastructure mode is the most common operation mode in which we could find wireless
networks. In this operation mode, each wireless client connects directly to a central device
called  Access  Point.  This  device  is  also  the  main  responsible  for  handling  the  clients’
authentication, authorization and link-level data security.
Ad-hoc mode is the less common operation mode in where each wireless client connects
directly with each other. There is no central device managing the connections, meaning that
each wireless client talks to each other freely. Security in this type of network is harder to
implement  because there is  no central  device that  could  authenticate  and authorize  the
wireless clients.
WiFi HaLoW (802.11ah)
WiFi interfaces use more power compared to other communication technologies; this makes
it  undesirable  for  remote  sensors  with  limited  battery  power.  A new  amendment  was
published targeting the low-resources devices.
The  IEEE  802.11ah  [51] operates  in  900  MHz  band,  which  helps  to  cut  down  power
consumption, extend transmission range, improve propagation (the ability to transmit in the
presence of  many interferences)  and penetration  (the ability  to  transmit  through various
barriers, such as walls or floors). It is expected that the radius of a WiFi HaLoW device will
be  twice that  of  modern WiFi  standards  and up to one kilometer,  which can be further
extended using relay. Actual data-rates supported by the IEEE 802.11ah will not be too high
with up to 26 channels that provide up to 100 Kbps throughput.
4.6.1. Security options
WiFi  networks  support  both  plain  text  communication  and  encrypted  communication.
Possible security protocols include Wireless Equivalent Privacy (WEP) and WiFi Protected
Access version 1 or 2 (WPA or WPA2).
In the WiFi protocol stack,  the security mechanisms locate between the medium access
control  layer  and  the  physical  layer.  Both  unicast  and  multicast  communication  can  be
secured using pairwise and group keys, respectively. Key establishment on smaller networks
is based, typically, on pre-shared secrets. Additionally, alternative mechanisms, which have
been  specified  in  WiFi  Protected  Setup  (WPS),  include:  8-digit  PIN entry,  ‘push  button’
model, and out-of-band channels such as NFC.
Figure 4.6: WiFi topologies
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Security Goal WEP WAP WAP2
Confidentiality RC4 CCMP: AES-128/256
CCM
or
GCMP: AES-128/256
GCM
Integrity CRC32 Custom keyed hashing
function (20 bits
security)Authentication Encrypted CRC32
Freshness 24 bits IV 48 bits IV 48-bit packet number
Availability Dynamic selection of channels
Authorization Pre-shared key Pre-shared key or EAP Pre-shared key or EAP
Key type 40-128 bits pre-sharedkey
128 bits pre-shared
key
Session keys
Pairwise key
Group key
Session keys
Key management
Key is the combination
of pre-shared key with
the IV
Per packet key (TKIP)
Changed periodically
and sent using specific
key-wrapping key
Required power low medium medium
Table 4.7: WiFi security options summary
The details of every security protocol is as follows:
• WEP was the default  encryption protocol introduced in the first  IEEE 802.11. t is
based on the RC4 encryption algorithm, with a secret key of 40 bits or 104 bits being
combined with 24-bit Initialization Vector (IV) to encrypt the plaintext message M and
its checksum (CRC32).
• WPA is based on the 802.11i and consists of three main components: TKIP, 802.1x,
and MIC. Important security improvements were implemented, such as key hierarchy
that  protects  the exposure  of  the  WPA main  key from attacks and implementing
802.1x protocol for access control to the network. Using key hierarchy means that
WPA does not directly use the main key to encrypt, instead the main key (Pairwise
Master Key) is used to generate other temporal keys such as session keys, group
keys,  etc.;  and  recursively  the  session  key  is  used  to  generate  the  per-packet
encryption key. The IV is also expanded from 24 bits to 48 bits long and assigning it
another  role  as  a  sequence  counter  for  avoiding replay  attacks.  Improvement  in
packet  integrity  protection  is  made  by  implementing  a  especially  designed
cryptographically  protected  hashing  function  instead  of  using  the  CRC32  linear
function. Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) was introduced for this purpose.
• WPA2 supports Counter Mode CBC-MAC Protocol (CCMP) or Temporal Key Integrity
Protocol (TKIP). CCMP uses AES-128/256 (128/256-bit keys and 128-bit blocks) in
Counter Mode with CBC-MAC (CCM) mode of operation. Setting WPA2 with CCMP
is the recommended method for securing WiFi. It also supports GCMP based on the
Galois Counter Mode (GCM) of the AES encryption algorithm.
Two authentication  methods  are  supported  by  WPA2:  personal,  which  uses  pre-
shared keys,  and enterprise,  which requires an additional  RADIUS authentication
server  and  can  use  multiple  underlying  authentication  mechanisms  through
Extensible Authentication Protocols (EAP). For pre-shared keys, the overall security
of the wireless network relies on choosing a secret key that is hard to guess. 
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From the key exchanged, several temporal and static keys are derived (e.g. session
keys, key-wrapping key). Temporal keys are changed periodically.
The AES-CCMP cipher suite uses a 128/256-bit key for encryption and decryption. 
An AES-CCMP key can be one of the following: Pairwise key to protect unicast traffic 
and Group key to protect multicast and broadcast traffic.
When a client initially connects to an access point, a secure challenge-based handshake to
test whether both devices have the same pre-shared key. The handshake never reveals the
pre-shared  key.  The purpose of  the  handshake  is  to  derive  a  temporary secret  key for
encryption and integrity.
4.6.2. Issues
Some vulnerabilities have been found on the security of the WiFi standards:
• WEP design flaws: Efficient attacks exist for WEP [52]. WEP uses a RC4 stream
cipher for data protection with a pre-shared secret key from 40 to 104 bits of length.
RC4 has some weaknesses that were used in order to attack WEP in the first place.
Next  attack  makes  use  of  flaws  in  the  WEP  protocol  itself,  like  the  integrity
mechanism based on CRC32 only and the lack of replay protection. Furthermore,
some access  points  never  change  their  WEP key,  which  once  known the  whole
system  is  in  jeopardy.  In  addition  to  that,  WEP  does  not  support  mutual
authentication. It only authenticates the client, making it open to rouge AP attacks.
More  complex  and  efficient  attacks  were  devised  exploiting  the  fact  that  IV  is
eventually  repeated.  The  use  of  WEP  for  confidentiality  and  authentication  is
deprecated.  The  WEP  algorithm  is  unsuitable  for  the  purposes  of  the  802.11
specification but it is still widely used in practice.
• WPA design flaws: Vulnerabilities have also been identified in WPA [52]. WPA TKIP
is also based on RC4 stream cipher.  Traffic injection,  man in the middle and key
recovery attacks were devised. TKIP algorithm is unsuitable for the purposes of the
802.11 specification but it is still widely used in practice.
• WPS  design  flaws:  Brute-force  attack  is  possible  against  some  WPS
implementations [53]. Several design flows reduce the number of trials to be brute-
forced before recovering the secret  (e.g.  WPS PIN.).  Some implementation flaws
were also found on commercial devices.
• Default passwords: Some default passwords or password based on the SSID and
MAC address  of  the  WiFi  access  point  were  used  by  some manufacturers  and
Internet Service Providers.
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4.7. IEEE 802.15.4
The IEEE defined the IEEE 802.15.4 standard was designed as a basis for a protocol stack
oriented towards short range, low data-rate and energy efficient communication.
It was originally introduced in 2003 [54], with several revisions and additions over the years
2006  [55], 2011  [56] and defines the physical (PHY) and Medium Access Control (MAC)
layers for short range communications at 250Kbps.
In 2006, the standard was revised and added two more PHY options. The MAC remained
backward compatible, but the revision added MAC frames with an increased version number
and a variety of MAC enhancements, including the following:
• Support for a shared time base with a data time stamping mechanism.
• Support for beacon scheduling.
• Synchronization of broadcast messages in beacon-enabled personal area networks
(PANs).
• Improved MAC layer security.
In 2011, the standard was revised to include the three amendments approved subsequent to
the 2006 revision. This effort added four more PHY options along with the MAC capability to
support ranging.
The  latest  version  of  the  standard  was  released  in  2015  [57] and  includes  previously
released amendments that add additional PHY layers and modifications to the MAC layer
which better support industrial markets. An enhanced acknowledgment frame that can carry
data and can be secured. A variety of new PHY modulation, coding, and band options to
support a wide variety of application needs. It  introduces changes to the security text to
correct errors and clarify the text and removal of the encrypt only mode.
There are three different types of devices that can exist in a network:
• Full Function Device (FFD): a node that has full levels of functionality. It can be
used for sending and receiving data, but it can also route data from other nodes. 
• Reduced Function Device (RFD): a device that has a reduced level of functionality.
Typically, it is an end node which may be typically a sensor or switch. RFDs can only
talk to FFDs as they contain no routing functionality. These devices can be very low
power devices because they do not need to route other traffic and they can be put
into a sleep mode when they are not in use. These RFDs are often known as child
devices as they need other parent devices with which to communicate. 
• Coordinator:  This is the node that controls the IEEE 802.15.4 network. This is a
special form of FFD. In addition to the normal FFD functions it also sets the IEEE
802.15.4 network up and acts as the coordinator or manager of the network.
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4.7.1. Security options
Security Goal 802.15.4
Confidentiality
AES-128
CCM*
AES-128, CTR mode
Integrity AES-128, CBC-MAC
(32, 64, 128 bits MIC)Authentication
Freshness Frame counter per key included in the MIC computation
Availability Last version supports frequency hopping techniques
Authorization Not specified
Key type Network, group, link
Key management Not specified
Required power Very low
Table 4.8: 802.15.4 security options summary
While in IEEE 802.15.4 the PHY layer does not offer any security, the MAC layer provides
multiple security levels:
• Level 0 – No security
• Level 1 – MIC-32: Data authenticity (4-bytes MIC)
• Level 2 – MIC-64: Data authenticity (8-bytes MIC)
• Level 3 – MIC-128: Data authenticity (16-bytes MIC)
• Level 4 – Reserved
• Level 5 – ENC-MIC-32: Data confidentiality and data authenticity (4-bytes MIC)
• Level 6 – ENC-MIC-64: Data confidentiality and data authenticity (8-bytes MIC)
• Level 7 – ENC-MIC-128: Data confidentiality and data authenticity (16-bytes MIC)
Figure 4.7: 802.15.4 topologies
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The 802.15.4 specification refers to the message authentication code as a message integrity
check (MIC) to differentiate it  from media access control.  An auxiliary security header is
defined to include the security parameters and the MIC.
Octets: 1 0/4 0/1/5/9
Security Control Frame Counter Key Identifier
Table 4.9: Format of the 802.15.4 Auxiliary Security Header
All security services are based on the AES-128 block cipher  [58] coupled with the CCM*
mode of operation [59]. Broadly, it first applies integrity protection over the header and data
payload using CBC-MAC and then encrypts the data payload and MAC using AES-CTR
mode.
Bits: 0 – 2 3 – 4 5 6 6 – 7
Security Level Key Identifier Mode Frame CounterSuppression ASN in nonce Reserved
Table 4.10: 802.15.4 Security Control field format
The CCM* mode is a slightly modified version of CCM, which gives more flexibility than the
standard CCM: CCM* enables to use either authentication or  encryption,  while  both are
always required in CCM.
Although the standard specifies security as optional,  the effect of having AES-128 in the
specification is that most IEEE 802.15.4 compatible hardware platforms implement some
form of hardware acceleration for AES-128. This ensures that the energy cost of enabling
security on these platforms is minimal.
The  cryptographic  mechanism provides  particular  combinations  of  the  following  security
services:
• Data  confidentiality:  Assurance  that  transmitted information  is  only  disclosed  to
parties for which it is intended. Levels 5 to 7.
• Data authenticity: Assurance of the source of transmitted information (and, hereby,
that information was not modified in transit). All levels but Level 0 (no security) and 4
(not supported).
• Replay protection: Assurance that duplicate information is detected by the use of a
frame counter. Always enabled.
Cryptographic frame protection uses either a key shared between two peer devices (link key)
or a key shared among a group of devices (group key), thus allowing some flexibility and
application-specific trade-offs between key storage and key maintenance costs versus the
cryptographic protection provided. If a group key is used for peer-to-peer communication,
protection  is  provided  only  against  outsider  devices  and  not  against  potential  malicious
devices in the key-sharing group.
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The IEEE 802.15.4 specification does not define how to do key management. The AES-128
block cipher uses 128 bit symmetric keys, but the generation, distribution and replacement of
those keys is left for the upper layers. The standard does however include a key storing
system inside the MAC PAN Information Base (PIB) and a way of implementing a form of
access control at the MAC layer, with pair-wise keys or group keys, through the use of the
MAC PIB and the Key Source field inside the Auxiliary Security Header.
4.7.2. Issues
IEEE 802.15.4 security has been considered in  several researches.  Since 802.15.4 is a
wireless communication using known frequency bands it  is  susceptible to all  the classic
physical wireless attacks like jamming, frame injection, sinkholes, etc.
The following is a list of reported issues (it has to be noted that most of them are fixed on the
2015 version of the specification or can be fixed in upper layers):
• Same-nonce attacks:  In previous versions of the 2015 standard, security level 4
was a level which provided only data confidentiality but without data authenticity. This
security level is deprecated and shall not be used in implementation compliant with
this standard. But if these versions are used, the same-nonce attacks are possible if,
at least, two frames are encrypted with identical key and nonce (with AES-CTR, data
is XORed with a key stream based on a nonce and a pre-shared key). If a nonce is
used repeatedly, key streams remain identical and if two such frames are captured, it
may be possible to decrypt them [60].
To illustrate this,  let’s consider that P and P’ are two payloads, C and C’ the two
corresponding encrypted payloads and K, the key stream for both payloads. We thus
have C+C’ = (P+K) + (P’+K) = P+P’. From here, mutually XORed plaintext payloads
can be recovered using statistics or if parts of any of the two payloads are guessable.
With the IEEE 802.15.4  standard,  this  can only  be due to frame counters  being
identical.
• Malleability attacks rise from the combination of the two previous vulnerabilities: if a
plain text can be retrieved using a same-nonce attack, then a simple XOR operation
will  reveal  the  corresponding  keystream.  From  there,  if  a  previously-used  frame
counter  is  accepted  upon  reception,  instead  of  replaying  a  captured  frame,  an
attacker  could  forge  a  new  one  based  on  the  retrieved  keystream  and  the
corresponding counter.
• A 802.15.4-specific  way  to  induce  DoS is  to  increase  the  frame  counter  while
replaying packets (it is not encrypted even in secured mode). Indeed, if an attacker
replays captured frames with a counter higher than expected, targeted devices may
update their  counter  accordingly.  Consequently,  future legitimate frames could be
rejected as the counter they provide would now be invalid  [60]. It is unfortunate as
the purpose of this mechanism is the prevention of replay attacks.
• Another kind of DoS is achieved by sending fake conflict notifications to coordinators,
thus  forcing  multiple  conflict  resolution  procedures  in  the  called  PANId  conflict
attack [61]. This can be considered as a Rogue AP attack.
PANId conflict is the situation when there is more than one PAN coordinator in the
same personal  operating  space with  the same PANId.  When that  happens,  PAN
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coordinators  can  detect  the  conflict  by  receiving  beacons  or  notifications  from
devices. Then, the conflict resolution procedure is executed: a new PANId is chosen
and  the  affected  coordinator  broadcasts  it  to  all  its  devices  and,  after  re-
synchronization with beacons, the network is operational again.
• Spoofed  ACK frames  can  be  forged  easily  as  they  are  not  encrypted,  even  in
secured mode. If a malicious individual can carry out radio-jamming activities during
a transmission before sending a spoofed ACK frame right after, hence deceiving the
emitter about the proper reception  [60]. Lost frames will  not be re-emitted: this is
again a form of DoS. In the last version of the specification, it is possible to protect
the ACK frames solving this issue if configured.
• GTS  attacks  rely  on  the  fact  that  portions  of  the  superframe  allocated  by  a
coordinator  are dedicated to particular  devices and thus are supposed to ensure
collision-free communications. Start and length of a GTS periods are given by GTS
descriptors embedded within  beacons,  which are not  encrypted,  even in  secured
mode [61].  Therefore, a malicious individual could extract this information and then
disrupt communications at the right time for a given device thus, yet again, a kind of
DoS.
• Specification implementation errors is a potential source of security issues. There
is  one  example  of  this  situation  that  we  are  able  to  disclose  because  faulty
components are publicly available: Digi XBee S1 IEEE 802.15.4 RF modules  [62].
The nonce, it was supposed to be a concatenation of the 8-octet source address of
the transmitting  device,  the  4-octet  frame counter  and  the 1-octet  key sequence
counter.  However,  this  last  parameter  was  not  correct.  In  fact,  its  value  never
increased and was always set to the value 4, which happens to be the security level
of CCM* in encryption-only mode. Coincidentally, between the 2003 and the 2006
standards, the key sequence counter is replaced by the security level when creating
the nonce. These modules were using IEEE 802.15.4-2006 for the security suites but
IEEE 802.15.4-2003 for the MAC frame format.
4.8. ZigBee
ZigBee is a technology for short range wireless data transfer especially designed for wireless
low-power devices. It is based on 802.15.4-2006 adding the network and application layers
on top of the physical and MAC layers defined by the 802.15.4. It also provides enhanced
security and support for mesh networks.
ZigBee is formed by a group of protocols maintained by the ZigBee Alliance, these protocols
may be not compatible with one another. They share the same basis for their physical layers,
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but ZigBee, ZigBee Pro [63] and ZigBee IP [64] are otherwise incompatible with each other.
On top of that several application profiles were published.
The first version of ZigBee specification, was released in 2004 (nowadays this version can
be considered obsolete and thus it is not supported anymore in new ZigBee devices). The
second version of ZigBee specification, also called as ZigBee was released in 2006. Then in
2007, ZigBee Pro was released, this version is used when the size of the ZigBee network is
very large and enhanced security features are needed to protect the network.
There are two types of devices based on their resources:
• Full-function device (FFD) – It has full-function calculation capabilities, processing
and memory is powerful enough to support complex computations. They are normally
supplied by a battery. They are able to play any ZigBee logical role.
• Reduced-function device (RFD) – It has limited calculation capabilities. It operates
at the low power situation, most of the time the device is asleep to save the power
consumption. They are able to act as End devices.
Then, four types of logical devices are defined in a ZigBee network:
• Coordinator – It is a FFD device responsible for the whole network. It chooses the
channel to be used by the network, starts the network by assigning how addresses
are allocated on the other nodes, managing devices to join or leave the network and
holding a list of nodes and routers.
• Router – It is a FFD device used to form and extend the ZigBee network topology. It
is also in charge of choosing the optimal route path to transmit the data.
• End device – It can be either a FFD or a RFD. It is used to model the low power and
low cost  devices.  It  is  only able to talk  to a FFD that  act  as a parent  (router  or
coordinator).
Figure 4.8: ZigBee architecture
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• Trust Center – It is in charge of ZigBee network security management. It  can be
combined with the device that has the role of Coordinator since security management
is needed during the Coordinator responsibilities.
Several topologies are supported by the ZigBee devices:
Battery lifetimes up to several years are possible in ZigBee enabled systems due to power-
saving modes and battery-optimized network parameters,  such as a selection of beacon
intervals, guaranteed time slots, and various enable/disable options.
End devices rely on a parent (a router or a coordinator) to remain awake and receive data
packets.  When an End device  wakes up from a sleep mode,  it  sends a message (poll
request) to its parent asking if there is any data available: upon receipt of the poll request,
the parent sends a response to the poll request as well as the buffered data (if any) of the
corresponding End device. In case there is no buffered data, the End device can return to a
sleep mode.
ZigBee IP
ZigBee IP is a version of the ZigBee standard for mesh networking for remote control and
sensing. It  is based on the ZigBee smart Energy 2.0 profile.  As the name indicates, the
ZigBee IP standard  provides  for  Internet  operation  using  IPv6-based  full  wireless  mesh
networks. 
It specifies a set of other standard specifications: 6LoWPAN adaptation layer, IPv6 network
layer, TCP/UDP transport layer, ROLL RPL routing and PANA/EAP/EAP-TLS security.
It maps IPv6 addresses to link layer addresses and there is no need for application gateway.
The system compresses the IPv6 headers using the techniques used in 6LoWPAN to reduce
the transmission overhead, increase efficiency and use RPL routing protocol.
Each node on a network can be individually addressed using IPv6 routing and addressing
protocol.
Figure 4.9: ZigBee topologies
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4.8.1. Security options
Security Goal ZigBee ZigBee IP
Confidentiality
AES-128 CCM
(32, 64, 128 bits MIC)Integrity
Authentication
Freshness Frame counter per key
Availability Mesh topology
Authorization
Pre-shared key
Trust Center link key
Install codes
PANA/EAP-TLS
PSK or ECDH with AES-128-
CCM (64-bit MIC)
Key type Master, Network, group, link
Key management
New key from the Trust Center
Multicast with old network key
Unicast with link key
New key from the Trust Center
Unicast with over PANA session
Required power very low low
Table 4.11: ZigBee security options summary
The present security architecture consists of the ZigBee coordinator which performs network
joining and key distribution duties, here the Thrust Center concept was introduced, which
plays three roles:
• Trust Center – forms a centralized network and allows routers and end devices to
join the network if they have a proper credentials. Only the Trust Center can issue
encryption keys. It also establishes a unique Trust Center Link key for each device as
they join and link keys for each pair of devices as requested.
• Network manager – Maintenance and distribution of the network keys.
• Configuration manager – Provision of end-to-end security between devices.
ZigBee implements two extra security layers on top of the 802.15.4. First one is the network
layer and second one is the application security layer.
• Master key – They are pre-installed in the device. Their function is to keep the link
keys exchange confidential in the Key Establishment procedure.
• Link keys – These are unique between each pair of nodes and are managed by the
application layer. More memory resources are required because there is a need for
encrypting the information shared between two devices.
• Network Key – It’s a key that is shared among all the nodes in the network. It is
randomly generated at different intervals by the Trust Center. Only if the node has the
network key they can join the network. The new network key is shared using the old
network key (broadcast) or the link keys (unicast).
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ZigBee uses AES-128 with CCM* for data confidentiality and authentication. There are two
policies that the Trust Center (the one which generates the network key) follows:
• Commercial mode (High security): Shares the master key and a different link key for
each device in the network.
• Residential mode (Standard security): Share only the Network key (this is done in
order to cope with low memory resources). Unsecured key-transport of Network Key
for every new device that joins the network or network key update procedure. 
The Trust Center periodically creates, distributes and then switches to a new network key.
Updated keys are sent to each device encrypted. It can be protected using the soon-to-be-
old network key or using the each of the Link keys per each node.
Application layer encryption is supported by creating an application level Link Key between
two devices’ applications.
Joining a centralized network with a Trust Center requires to provide credentials that have
been previously entered into the Trust Center out-of-band (Trust center Link key):
• There is a default Trust Center Link key defined in the specification.
• From ZigBee 3.0, the option to add a Link Key per each joining device is derived from
an install code. The install code shall be manually entered to the Trust Center via
some kind of out-of-band method.
ZigBee IP
Zigbee IP provides end-to-end security using TLS 1.2 protocol,  link layer  frame security
based on AES-128-CCM algorithm and support for public key infrastructure using standard
X.509 v3 certificates and ECC-256 cipher suite.
Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA) is a network-layer protocol
with which a node can authenticate itself to gain access to the network. PANA does not
define a new authentication protocol and rather uses EAP over User Datagram Protocol
(UDP). It is used to authenticate joining nodes and to transport the network security material
from the Coordinator to each authenticated node in the ZigBee IP network. It is used as the
EAP  transport  for  carrying  authentication  data  between  a  joining  Node  and  the
Authentication Server.
Extensible  Authentication  Protocol  (EAP)  is  an  authentication  frame  work  that  supports
multiple authentication methods. EAP runs directly over the link layer and supports duplicate
detection with re-transmission but does not allow fragmentation of packets. 
It  used TLS 1.2 handshake to provide mutual  authentication between the node and the
coordinator. Two mandatory cipher suites are specified: TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8
and TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8. The PANA session remains open for
the purposes of network key update and maintenance.
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4.8.2. Issues
Since ZigBee is based on versions of the 802.15.4 prior of the 2015 version, it inherits all of
the 802.15.4 issues for the physical and MAC layers (see section  4.7.2).  Several issues
directly related to the ZigBee were identified in [65]:
• Residential mode: When the Residential mode (Standard Security) policy is used,
the network  key is  transmitted unsecured  over-the-air  and thus  this  is  a  serious
vulnerability for the security of the ZigBee enabled networks leading to the conclusion
that the Standard Security level cannot be recommended for safety critical systems.
However,  it  is  possible  to  manually  pre-install  network  keys  onto  each legitimate
device of the ZigBee network, but this is clearly a trade-off between usability and
security,  at  least  when  the  size  of  the  network  is  large:  therefore,  the  network
administrator is likely to opt for less secure but more usable options.
Some profiles like ZigBee Smart Energy does not allow this. These use public key
ECC certificates, which are bound to the device, to protect the key exchange.
• Default keys:  On the other hand, other application profiles like Home Automation
and  the  Light  Link  profiles  specify  that  the  default Trust  Center  Link  Key  is
“ZigBeeAlliance09”. It introduces a high risk to the secrecy of the network key if an
attacker is sniffing while device commissioning.
• Another security concern lies in the shared network key. By compromising one of the
nodes of a ZigBee network, an attacker could dump the node’s internal memory and
retrieve this network key, giving them access to the network. Such a scenario may be
particularly dangerous in certain configurations used for home networks that have
sensors deployed outside of the house, such as an external lamp. On the other hand,
to obtain the current Network key is not useful to be able to decrypt past messages
protected by older Network keys.
• ZigBee End-Device Sabotage Attack: An attacker impersonates a ZigBee router or
coordinator in order to abuse the End device poll  requests. It  sends broadcast or
multi-cast replies to all poll request of legitimate End devices thus making them to
constantly waking up, dramatically increasing the power consumption and eventually
leading to battery exhaustion. It is a kind of DoS attack.
4.9. Thread
The  Thread  is  an  open  standard  for  reliable  low  power  wireless  device-to-device
communication.
It is based on 802.15.4 adding the network and transport layers on top of the physical and
MAC layers defined by the 802.15.4. The IEEE 802.15.4 2006 version of the specification is
used for the Thread version 1.1.1, 2017  [66]. Spread spectrum technology is used at the
physical layer to provide good immunity to interference.
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Upper  layers  are  based  on  adaptation  layer  6LoWPAN  to  be  able  to  route  IPv6
communications. All devices have IPv6 addresses plus a short Thread address. Devices use
RPL routing to forward packets. A routing table is populated with network addresses and the
appropriate next hop.
The stack is designed to provide secure and reliable operations even with the failure or loss
of individual devices. While there are a number of devices in the system that perform special
functions, the Thread design is such that they can be replaced without impacting the ongoing
communication.  For  example,  a  Sleepy  End  Device  Child  requires  a  Parent  router  for
communications so this Parent represents a single point of failure for its communications.
However, the Sleepy End Device can and will  select another Parent Router if  its Parent
Router is unavailable. Four device types are defined:
• Border  routers:  A  Border  Router  is  a  specific  type  of  router  that  provides
connectivity from the 802.15.4 network to adjacent networks on other physical layers
(Wi-Fi, Ethernet, etc.) acting as a gateway. It offers routing services for off network
operations. A Thread Network typically contains one or more Border Routers.
• Routers:  Routers  provide  routing  services  to  network  devices.  They  maintain
neighbor, child and routing tables and connect with each other to maintain the mesh
network. Routers also provide joining and security services for devices trying to join
the thread Network. Routers are not designed to sleep. Routers can downgrade their
functionality and become Router-Eligible End Devices (REEDs).
• Router-Eligible End devices: REEDs can become routers but due to the network
topology or conditions these devices are not acting as routers. As such, a REED is
not a specific device type but a state of a routing-capable device when in the Thread
Network.  These  devices  do  not  forward  messages  or  provide  joining  or  security
services for other devices in the network but listens to routing information messages.
If necessary, the network manages the transition of a device from REED to router
without user interaction.
Figure 4.10: Thread architecture
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• Sleepy  End  devices:  Sleepy  End  Devices  (SEDs)  are  host  devices.  They
communicate only through their parent router and cannot forward messages for other
devices.
• Leader: A leader manages a registry of assigned router identifications and accepts
requests from REEDs to become routers. All information contained in the Leader is
present in the other Thread Routers. So, if the Leader fails or loses connectivity with
the Thread network, another Thread Router is elected, and takes over as Leader
without user intervention.
Devices join a network as either a sleepy end device or a REED. A REED can learn the
network configuration, then it potentially requests to become a Thread Router.
All routers exchange with other routers their cost of routing to other routers in the network in
a  compressed  format  using  MLE  (Mesh  Link  Establishment).  MLE  operates  below  the
routing layer and uses one hop link local unicasts and multicasts between routers.
MLE messages are used to identify, configure, and secure links to neighboring devices as
the topology and physical environment change. MLE is also used to distribute configuration
values that are shared across the network such as the channel and PAN.
4.9.1. Security options
The Thread Network is designed to provide a high level of security during the process of
adding devices  to  the network  and  during  normal  network  operation.  During  the  joining
process,  devices  must  be  specifically  authenticated  and  authorized,  and  required  to
complete a key agreement mechanism.
Figure 4.11: Thread topology
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Security Goal Thread
Confidentiality
AES-128 CCM
(32, 64, 128 bits MIC)Integrity
Authentication
Freshness Frame counter per key
Availability Self-healing Mesh topology
Authorization DTLS handshake with Commissioning credentialsDTLS handshake with Joining credentials
Key type Network key, MAC key, MLE Link keys
Key management Key rotation based on synchronized keygeneration on every device
Required power Very low
Table 4.12: Thread security options summary
Once  on  the  network,  all  communications  are  secured  with  a  MAC  key  based  on  the
802.15.4 MAC security. ENC-MIC-32 is the default security level for Thread MAC security.
The Thread network is protected with a network-wide key (Network key) from which two keys
are derived,  one for  the underlying MAC layer and another one for the MLE messages.
HMAC-SHA256, where the key is the Network Key and the message is a sequence counter,
is used to produce both keys.
MAC security is used for all the messages. Security is enabled by default and mandatory for
all devices. ENC-MIC-32 is the default value for Thread MAC security. The same happens
for the MLE messages.
Commissioning  must  be  able  to  take place  in  a  system where  a  Joiner  that  wishes  to
participate in the Thread Network is authenticated using a device known as a Commissioner.
The Commissioner have some sort of user interface.
Adding  a  new  device  to  a  Thread  Network  is  the  process  of  a  human  administrator
authenticating it to the network as eligible for joining, followed by the commissioning of the
device with the master key for the network over a secured channel. Only after completing
this process, the new device is qualified to attach and participate on the secured Thread
Network.
Thread defines a protocol for securely authenticating, commissioning and joining new, non-
trusted devices to a mesh network [67]. Two steps are defined:
1. Commissioner candidate is authorized. There are two types of commissioners:
− External commissioner: It resides in the exterior of the Thread network and it is
commonly  an  application  on  a  smartphone  or  computer.  The  commissioning
application must authenticate itself to the Border Router by means of a successful
DTLS session using out-of-band pre-shared commissioning credentials (6 to 255
bytes passphrase). Then, the Border Router arbitrates with the Leader on behalf
of the external commissioner to be authorized as the network commissioner.
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− Native commissioner:  It  resides in the Thread network and it  is commonly a
Router that acts also as the commissioner.  An authorization petition is directly
sent to the Leader.
2. The joiner device is commissioned. The joiner device is attached to a Joiner Router
(will be the parent router of the device once authorized) that will forward the DTLS
handshake messages between the joiner device and the commissioner.  Once the
joiner device is authenticated with a successful DTLS session using out-of-band pre-
shared  joining  credentials  (6  to  32  bytes  passphrase),  a  pair-wise  key  will  be
established.
3. The Network key is sent to the joiner device protected with the pair-wise key.
The fundamental security used during the joining for authentication and key agreement is an
elliptic curve variant of J-PAKE (EC-JPAKE), using the NIST P-256 elliptic curve. J-PAKE is
a  PAKE  (Password  Authenticated  Key  Exchange)  with  “juggling”  (hence  the  “J”).  It
essentially uses elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman for key agreement and Schnorr signatures as a
Non-Interactive  Zero-Knowledge  proof  mechanism  to  authenticate  two  peers  and  to
establish a shared secret between them based on the passphrase.
The  first  device  in  a  network,  typically  the  initial  Leader,  should  be  out-of-band
commissioned  to  inject  the  correct  user  generated  Commissioning  Credentials  into  the
Thread Network, or provide a known default Commissioning Credential to be changed later.
Thread defines key rotation mechanism that is synchronized with the neighboring devices by
the  use  the  Key  Index  field  present  in  the  802.15.4  MAC layer’s  security  header.  Key
switching is performed when the current key rotation time of use is expired or the node
receives and successfully processes an incoming message with Key Index equal to the next
key index on the key rotation pool of keys.
4.9.2. Issues
Since Thread is based on versions of the 802.15.4 prior of the 2015 version, it inherits all of
the 802.15.4 issues for the physical and MAC layers (see section 4.7.2). It has to be noted
that no security analysis was found about the security of the Thread technology.
• A first security concern lies in the shared Network key. By compromising one of the
nodes of a Thread network, an attacker could dump the node’s internal memory and
retrieve this Network key, giving them access to the network.
• Furthermore,  since the key rotation is  changing the MAC and MLE keys but  the
Network key is always the same and that the diversification factor is a monotonic
counter, compromising the Network key may enable the attacker to compute previous
and  future  MAC  and  MLE  keys  being  able  to  decipher  past  and  future
communications.
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4.10. Z-Wave
Z-Wave is a low-power wireless communication protocol. It was designed for remote control
applications in residential and small-size commercial environments. It has an architecture
similar to ZigBee. Z-Wave is a complete protocol stack that covers all layers, from physical to
application layer.
All  Z-Wave  devices  uses  sub-gigahertz  radio  frequencies  as  per  the  ITU-T  G.9959
specification [68] for MAC and PHY layers. It uses a sub-1GHz frequency range, this way, it
avoids interference with other wireless technologies used in domestic context at the 2.4 GHz
range (Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, ZigBee, etc.). Z-Wave provides a range of 30 meters for point-to-
point communications and allows a transmission rate of up to 100 kbps.
The simplest network is a single controllable device and a Primary Controller.  Additional
devices can be added at any time, as can secondary controllers. A Z-Wave mesh network
consists in a controller device and up to 232 nodes. Each Z-Wave network is identified by a
Network ID, and each device is further identified by a Node ID. The Network ID (also called
Home ID) is the common identification of all nodes belonging to one logical Z-Wave network.
The Network ID has a length of 4 bytes (32 bits) and is assigned to each device, by the
primary controller, when the device is "included" into the Network.
During bootstrapping, the Primary Controller asks the new node to discover its neighbors.
Thanks to the neighbor nodes information, the Primary Controller builds a network map and
knows the different possible routes to reach a node.
In order  to  determine the best  route  to a  destination  node,  each device  in  the  Z-Wave
network maintains a network topology that indicates all other devices in proximity.
Figure 4.12: Z-Wave architecture
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Z/IP Clients and Gateway
The Z/IP Gateway bridges the low-power Z-Wave wireless communications protocol with the
Internet of Things (IoT) by assigning a unique private IP address to each device within a Z-
Wave network.
The Z/IP Gateway is putting Z-Wave command classes’ payload on a UDP packet when
sending data from the Z-Wave network to the LAN of consumer devices and the other way
around.
Z/IP is a Z-Wave Command Class encapsulation datagram for sending Z-Wave datagrams
(Command  Class  messages)  to  Z/IP enabled  devices.  This  makes  Z/IP communication
independent of the Link Layer. All that matters is that the receiving device supports IP, UDP
port 4123, Z/IP and Z/IP Command Classes.
Z/IP Gateway’s capabilities include:
• IPv6-compliant, Z-Wave acts as Link Layer to IP.
• Internet Protocol routing: Transmitting Z-Wave UDP/IP datagrams between Z-Wave
devices and IP address.
• Translating IP address to Z-Wave HomeID+NodeID.
• DHCP Client (assigning NodeIDs to PAN device and assigning IP address to those
devices).
• Full support for Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) ping of devices.
• Caching of device capabilities, allowing IP devices to discover and identify all Z-Wave
devices, including sleeping devices.
4.10.1. Security options
Wireless security was enabled on the Z-Wave Plus in 2013 [69]. When secure transmission
mode is enabled, the frame payload is encrypted and an 8-byte authentication header is
added.
It has to be noted that there is the option of devices using commands from a supported
command class that is not required by the device to use the security layer.
Figure 4.13: Z-Wave Z/IP topology
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Security Goal Z-Wave Plus Z-Wave S2
Confidentiality AES-128 - OFB
AES-128 – CCM
(64-bits MAC)Integrity AES-128 – CBC-MAC
(64-bits MAC)Authentication
Freshness 64-bit nonce (PRNG) Pre-agreed nonce andCTR_DRBG (13-bytes)
Availability Mesh topology
Authorization Custom protocol with knownpre-shared Master key
ECDH-256 with user
interaction
Key type Network Network and Group
Key management Protected by known pre-shared Master key
Out-of-band authenticated
ECDH with temporary keys
Required power Very low Medium
Table 4.13: Z-Wave security options summary
The secured commands encryption and authentication services are provided by three AES-
128 keys: Network key, and then the encryption (ENC) and authentication (MAC) keys (both
of them derived from the network key).
The  Network  key  is  generated  by  the  network  controller  by  Pseudo  Random  Number
Generator  (PRNG) and sent to all  the devices requiring cryptographic services.  The key
exchange is performed encrypted using a default key hard-coded in firmware.
The encryption and authentication keys are obtained by encrypting two 16-byte seed values,
also hard-coded in firmware, using AES in ECB operation mode and the network key.
Z-Wave computes a Message Authentication Code (MAC) using CBC-MAC with AES, the 8
bytes authentication header, in order to ensure data origin authentication and data integrity.
It also uses 64-bit nonce values (generated using PRNG) when computing the MAC in order
to provide anti-replay protection (freshness).
The frame payload is encrypted using AES in OFB operation mode, in order to provide data
confidentiality.
S2 commands
In 2016, the Z-Wave Alliance announced stronger security standards for devices known as
Security 2 (S2)  [70]. It improves the used encryption standard and mandates new pairing
procedures for each device, with unique PIN or QR codes on each device. S2 separates the
devices into different groups with different keys.
The S2 authentication process allows an including controller to verify that a joining node is
indeed the physical device that it claims to be. Depending on the user interface, an including
controller may allow the installer to enter a device specific key that can be read visually or
scanned as a QR code. This step ensures which devices are included into the network. This
key is the first 16 bytes of the 32-byte long ECDH public key of the joining node. The rest of
the key is sent during the joining protocol. With ECDH, a temporary link key. The link key
allows an including controller to transfer the network key securely to a joining node.
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The nonces required by CCM as input are generated by a CTR_ DRBG algorithm, which
allows the two parties to stay synchronized and not have to exchange nonces before each
communication. Should decryption fail on the receiver side, it will request a fresh nonce from
the sender and sync back up.
Z/IP Clients and Gateway
The Z/IP Gateway [71] controls access to the Z-Wave network by only forwarding commands
from trusted LAN clients or from a trusted Internet host.
LAN hosts and Z-Wave nodes communicate via a Z/IP Gateway which terminates the DTLS
encryption and strips Z/IP and IP headers before forwarding Z-Wave commands securely in
the Z-Wave network.  DTLS 1.0  with  PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA or  PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA
may be used.
The Pre-shared key used to perform the key exchange is provided by the Gateway. It is
printed on the device or shown by a display upon physical interaction with it. It is the same
for all the devices in the LAN network.
Connection  to  an  Internet  portal  is  protected  by  TLS based  tunnel.  The portal  may be
configured to only accept trusted gateways and the gateway to only accept trusted internet
hosts. Z-Wave gateway monitors periodical heartbeat signals from all nodes in the Z-Wave
network so that jamming can be detected within minutes after the attack is initiated.
4.10.2. Issues
• The first public vulnerability research was published in 2013 [69]. It was discovered
an implementation error on a commercial door lock that allows an attacker to reset
the established network key to a known value (remote re-keying). Then, the injection
of unauthorized commands to the Z-Wave device was possible opening the door lock
without using the controller.
It is also discovered that the initial network key exchange was protected by a hard-
coded temporary default  key in the chip’s  firmware with  all  its bytes equal to
zero.
• In  [72] a hardware key extraction vulnerability was identified. It was found that the
network  key was stored in  an external  persistent  memory without  any protection
against physical memory dump.
It is also discovered that the authentication and the encryption key on the device that
are derived from the network key with some seeds with values of all 5s and all As
respectively.
• In [73] some vulnerabilities were found on the Z-Wave gateway. They were related to
the absence of authentication on the management web console of the gateways and
several classic web vulnerabilities like path traversal, Server side request forgery and
Cross-site request forgery. Communications between the gateway and the Internet
server were also non-protected. During BlackHat 2013 several commercial Z-Wave
devices were shown to be under-protected with these kinds of vulnerabilities.
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4.11. SigFox
SigFox  technology  is  a  good  fit  for  any  application  that  needs  to  send  small,  not  very
frequent bursts of data. Examples such as basic alarm systems, location monitoring, and
simple metering are one-way systems that might make use of such network infrastructure.
The SigFox network is designed for  small  messages sent every now and then. It  is  not
appropriate for high-bandwidth usages. It is designed for devices that don’t have a lot to say,
need to be very inexpensive, require very small power budgets and require very long range. 
SigFox wireless systems send very small amounts of data which is 12 bytes for the uplink
(maximum 140 per day) and 8 bytes for the downlink (maximum 4 per day). The downlink
usage is intended for configuration and data requests.
It has a very slow rate from 100 bps to 600 bps using standard radio transmission methods
namely  phase-shift  keying  (D-BPSK)  for  uplink  and  frequency-shift  keying  (GFSK)  for
downlink.
It runs in ultra-narrow band (UNB) and is able to send lots of simultaneous, small frames (in
time) achieving a high capacity of the network. This allows the receiver to only listen in a tiny
slice of spectrum which mitigates the effect of noise. It requires an inexpensive endpoint
radio and a more sophisticated base station to manage the network.
In the SigFox network the devices are always initiating the communication exchanges to
save battery and provide certain security since an adversary will have smaller windows of
opportunity.
Figure 4.14: SigFox topology
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4.11.1. Security options
Security Goal SigFox
Confidentiality AES-128 based encryption (optional)
Integrity Authentication token based on AES-128
(2 - 5 bytes MIC)Authentication
Freshness Sequence counter inside the authenticated payload
Availability Same message sent several times at randommoments and different frequencies
Authorization Personalized during manufacturing
Key type
Authentication key
Encryption key
Key management None
Required power Very low
Table 4.14: SigFox security options summary
SigFox is a proprietary solution and it is difficult to find information about the actual security
mechanisms  that  implements.  The  following  is  information  gathered  from  SigFox  white
papers [74] and [75], a presentation about SigFox in IETF 96 [76] and a ST Microelectronics’
data sheet of a micro-controller intended to be used for SigFox connection [77].
In a SigFox network, each device stores a unique ID, a Network Authentication Key, and an
Encryption Key, the last two being secret, and based on AES-128. The keys are provisioned
during manufacturing.
Each message sent or received by a device contains a cryptographic token generated using
the Authentication Key. This token authenticates the sender. The token is based on AES-128
computations and the result is truncated to 2 - 5 bytes.
To make sure there are no copies or duplication possible, the system inserts  a sequence
counter. Furthermore, the protocol sends each message at three random times and on three
different  frequencies.  As  a  result,  some resistance  against  Denial  of  Service  attacks  is
achieved.
By default, data is conveyed over the air without any encryption. However, depending on the
application,  this data may be very sensitive and its privacy must be guaranteed.  SigFox
gives customers the option to either implement their own end-to-end encryption solutions or
to rely on an encryption solution provided by the SigFox protocol.
The  communications  between  the  Base  Stations  and  the  Cloud  services  and  Business
Applications  are  sent  through  a  VPN.  Cloud  on  and  Business  Applications  servers  are
secured and distributed physically. Connection to Business application is through HTTPS.
4.11.2. Issues
No security analysis was found about the SigFox security but some issues can be identified:
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• No key management: The keys used for data protection are never changed. If one
of  these  keys  is  compromised  future  and  past  communications  can  be
eavesdropped. In such a case, message injection is also possible.
• Truncated MIC: It seems that the MIC is based on a AES-128 computation (16 bytes
block  size)  and  then  truncated  to  2-5  bytes  to  create  the  authentication  token.
Reducing the size of a cryptographic MIC should be done carefully since it reduces
the space for brute forcing all the possible values.
• Replay  attack:  It  is  not  clear  what  happens  when  the  sequence  counter  value
reaches its maximum value. If  the counter is reset, then it  enables replay attacks
since the same sequence number will be used with the same key. An adversary can
wait to the counter to overflow to be able to replay messages.
• Optional encryption: The fact that the encryption is optional will make that most of
the messages are not protecting its confidentiality.
4.12. EC-GSM-IoT, LTE-M and  N  B-IoT
Through the modification of their cellular networks, the 3GPP have standardized three low
power wide area network solutions operating in licensed spectrum bands.
• Extended Coverage GSM IoT (EC-GSM-IoT): is a 3GPP Release 13 feature based
on  eGPRS  and  designed  as  a  high  capacity,  long  range,  low  energy  and  low
complexity cellular system for IoT communications. The optimizations made in EC-
GSM-IoT are designed to allow the technology to be introduced into existing GSM
enabling extensive coverage. It introduces a security framework comparable with 4G
standards.
• LTE Machine Type Communication Category M1 (LTE-M): It is a 3GPP Release
13  feature  with  three  main  objectives:  reduce  complexity  to  the  LTE,  increase
coverage and improve battery life, while allowing reuse of the LTE installed base. It
still provides many similar features to legacy LTE, opening the possibility for a LTE-M
to integrate voice in IoT applications.
• Narrow-band IoT (NB-IoT):  It  is  a 3GPP Release 13 feature that reuses various
principles and building blocks of the LTE physical layer and higher protocol layers to
enable rapid standardization and product development. NB-IoT has been designed to
offer extended coverage compared to the traditional GSM networks.
Several  functions  were  designed  to  support  IoT services  and  also  for  devices  that  are
potentially constrained by their battery technologies:
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• Power saving mode: This capability is focused on reducing the power consumption
enabling the devices to enter a new deep sleep mode. It is designed for infrequent
data  transmission  and  that  can  accept  a  corresponding  latency  in  the  mobile
terminating communication.
• Extended idle-mode discontinuous reception: It allows the device to turn part of
its circuitry off during this period to save power. The device is not listening for paging
or downlink control channels, so the network should not try to contact the device.
• Enhancements for cellular IoT applications: Optimizations suited for applications
involving lower data volumes transfer and for applications where the possible range
of  data  volume  transmission  is  unpredictable  and  can  vary  quite  significantly  in
frequency and volume and introducing the concept of connection suspending and
resuming.
The  entities  that  appear  in  this  case  are  the  User  Equipment  (UE),  the  eNodeB  (the
antenna), the Mobility Management Entity (MME) and the Home Subscriber Server (HSS)
who will authenticate the UE.
4.12.1. Security options
Security Goal EC-GSM-IoT / NB-IoT / LTE-M
Confidentiality AES-128 CTR mode or SNOW 3G
Integrity (4 byte MIC)
AES-128 CMAC or SNOW 3GAuthentication
Freshness Sequence counter
Availability Frequency hopping techniques
Authorization EPS AKA procedure based on a pre-shared secret. 
Key type
Pre-shared key
Session Ciphering key
Session Integrity key
Key management Each time the UE access the network a new set of sessionkeys is derived. Key derived with keyed HMAC-SHA256.
Required power moderate
Table 4.15: 3GPP IoT security options summary
All three technologies share similar network architectures and provide similar transport layer
security mechanisms and constraints. Several security mechanisms are available [78].
Figure 4.15: LTE access network architecture
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They are mostly the ones used in the standard LTE networks:
• LTE  authentication:  Performs  mutual  authentication  between  the  UE  and  the
network. It is based on a pre-shared key and a cryptographic computation over a
nonce generated by the HSS. The MME sends the nonce (RAND), a key derivation
index (KASME) and an authentication token (AUTN) computed using the shared key.
The UE can verify the authenticity of the HSS and compute its authentication token
(RES) that will be verified by the MME.
• Securing  of  communication  channels:  Once  the  UE  and  the  HSS  are
authenticated, Ciphering and Integrity keys are derived from the combination of the
pre-shared key and the RAND that will be used to protect further communications.
• Secure provisioning and storage of device identity and credentials: It is required
the use of a UICC to store the UE identification and secret keys. This type of device
is designed to be resistant to physical attacks.
• Ability to support “end-to-end security” at the application level: 3GPP security
mechanisms can be used by the application layer for application authentication and
data confidentiality, but encryption would not be used, if not needed.
The cryptographic algorithms supported are SNOW 3G (stream cipher designed by Lund
University) and AES-128. Confidentiality is protected by the use of CTR mode and Message
Authentication Codes are computed with a CMAC algorithm.
4.12.2. Issues
Several  issues were identified  in  the  document  [79],  mainly due to the first  unprotected
messages before mutual authentication is performed:
• Eavesdropping,  Man  in  the  middle  attack  (MitM): An  adversary can  take
advantage  of  a  known  weakness  in  LTE  wherein  the  user  identity  transference
occurs non-encrypted, in clear text between the UE and the eNodeB, during the initial
attach  procedure.  This  allows  an  eavesdropper  to  track  the  user  cell-location  or
launch a Man in the Middle attack by user IMSI impersonation and relay of user
messages using IMSI catchers.
• Temporary blocking mobile devices: Since the Tracking Area Update (TAU) reject
messages are not protected, an adversary can spoof such a message to block the
access to the network to a target device provoking a denial of service attack.
• Soft  downgrade  to  GSM:  An  adversary  can  trigger  a  soft  downgrade  of  the
connection  to GSM, known for  being more insecure.  The same TAU Reject  and
Attach Reject messages, a rogue base station can indicate a victim mobile device
that it  is  not allowed to access 3G and LTE services on that given operator.  The
target device will  then only attempt to connect to GSM base stations. An attacker
could combine this with a rogue GSM base station, which would open the doors to a
full Man in the Middle attack, fully eavesdropping all mobile network traffic. The attack
is not possible with devices not supporting GSM.
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4.13. LoRaWAN
LoRaWAN is an open protocol designed to integrate billions of devices in the Internet of
Things. It is maintained by the LoRa Alliance, an open, non-profit association of members.
The last version of the LoRaWAN specification is 1.0.2 [80].
It  supports  low-cost,  mobile,  and  secure  bi-directional  communication.  It  is  normally
deployed  in  a  star  of  stars  topology in  which  gateways  are  transparent  bridge  relaying
messages between end-devices and a central network server in the backend. Gateways and
backend server are connected via a standard IP connection. End-devices use single-hop
wireless  communications  to  one  or  many  gateways.  Gateways  support  multicast
communications enabling services like software upgrade over the air.
Communications are spread out on different frequency channels and data rates ranging from
300bps to 50kbps. It is designed to communicate over large ranges from 5km to 15 Km. 
It uses the LoRa modulation technique that is based on spread-spectrum and a variation of
chirp spread spectrum.
It supports three classes of end-devices:
• Class A (baseline): the most energy efficient to maximize battery lifetime. This kind
of nodes initiates data transfers followed by two short listening windows to receive
commands from the server. The transmission slot scheduled by the end-device is
based on its own communication needs (ALOHA-type of protocol).
• Class  B (beacon):  similar  to  class  A nodes  but  with  an  extra  listening  window
allowing the server to send data to the node in a predefined time marked using a
beacon. The server also receives the beacon knowing when the node is listening.
Figure 4.16: LoRaWAN topology
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• Class C (continuous): always listening nodes. Suitable for the most data-intensive
applications or for the ones that requires high responsiveness.
4.13.1. Security options
Security Goal LoRaWAN
Confidentiality
AES-128 CCM
(4-byte MIC)Integrity
Authentication
Freshness Frame counter
Availability Several antennas may be at range
Authorization
Over-the-air activation using Application key
or
Personalization
Key type
Application key per device
Session Network key per device
Session Application key per device
Key management
Over-the-air activation: keys changed on every reset
or
Personalization: None
Required power Low
Table 4.16: LoRaWAN security options summary
LoRaWAN standard  includes  two  security  layers:  one  for  the  network  and  one  for  the
application. Network-layer security ensures device authentication for network messages and
Application-layer  security  ensures  the  protection  of  the  application  data  (confidentiality,
integrity).
Network security is based on the 802.15.4 security. So, it uses AES-128 keys in CCM mode
to  both  encrypt  the  message  payload  and  to  produce a  MIC to  verify  the  integrity  and
authentication.
Secure communications are based on the use of two different keys:
• Network Session key: It is an AES-128 key specific for an end-device. This is used
by  the  end-device  and  the  Network  server  to  compute  and  verify  the  message
integrity code (MIC). It is also used for encryption and decryption of the payload of
the Network messages.
• Application Session key: It is an AES-128 key specific for an end-device. It is used
by the end-device and the Application server to encrypt and decrypt the payload of
application-specific data messages. It may also be used for computing and verifying
an application-level MIC (which may be included in the payload of application-specific
data messages).
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Each  device  should  have  a  unique  set  of  Network  and  Application  session  keys.  So,
compromising  the  keys  of  one  device  shouldn’t  compromise  the  security  of  the
communications of other devices.
When an end-device is added to the LoRaWAN network, it needs to be personalized and
activated. Key exchange is performed by two available methods:
• Over-the-Air  Activation:  Based on a  globally  unique identifier  and a handshake
communication.  End-device  requests  to  be  joined  to  the  Application  server  by
sending its globally unique device identifier,  application identifier  and a nonce. All
authenticated with the Application key.
The Application key is an AES-128 application key specific for the end-device that is
assigned by the application owner to the end-device and most likely derived from an
application-specific  root  key  exclusively  known  to  and  under  the  control  of  the
application provider.
Application server answers with encrypted and authenticated Device address and a
nonce from where the Network and Application session keys are derived.
• Activation by personalization: The Device address and the two session keys are
directly stored at production time.
4.13.2. Issues
Several  vulnerabilities  in  the  LoRaWAN  specification  and  attacks  were  devised  in  the
document [81]:
• No key management in Personalization mode: The keys used for data protection
are  never  changed.  If  one  of  these  keys  is  compromised  future  and  past
communications can be eavesdropped.
• Replay attack in Personalization mode: The Frame counter is reset when an end-
device joins the network. If the Personalization mode is used, after a device reset,
the Frame counter  will  be  also  reset  with  the same keys as  a previous  session
enabling replay attacks.
• Replay  attack  in  over-the-air  mode:  The  Frame  counter  is  also  reset  when  it
reaches its maximum value, thus enabling replay attacks. An adversary can wait to
the counter to overflow to be able to replay messages.
• Eavesdropping: Since the same counter value and the same key can be used for
more than one message, the payload of a protected message can be eavesdropped
using the Same-nonce attacks issue seen in 802.15.4 (see section 4.7.2).
• Denial  of  Service:  In  [82],  it  is  identified that  if  multiple LoRaWAN networks are
present in the area, since LoRaWAN channels are shared, additional interference will
increase packet-error-rate. Since LoRa has a low co-channel dynamic range, without
a closed-loop power control scheme, any nodes close to the gateway will drown out
nodes far away. These issues can be exploited to perform a DoS attack.
• Key ownership conflict: In [83], it is identified that since the two session keys are
derived from the Application key (owned by the Application provider), the Application
provider can derive itself the Network Session key and thus clone devices.
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4.14. 6LoWPAN
6LoWPAN is an acronym of IPv6 over Low power Wireless Personal Area Networks [84].
6LoWPAN acts as an adaptation layer between the IPv6 networking layer and the IEEE
802.15.4 link layer.
It provides the following features:
• IPv6 packet  encapsulation:  The 6LoWPAN layer  takes the IPv6 packets,  wraps
them using encapsulation headers, and then subsequently sends them over-the-air
using the IEEE 802.15.4 MAC and PHY layers.
• IPv6 packet fragmentation and reassembly: To meet the IPv6-required MTU of at
least 1280 bytes with the IEEE 802.15.4 layer offering at most 102 bytes of payload
per  frame,  a  fragmentation  mechanism below the  IP layer  is  specified  using  an
optional Fragmentation Header before the actual IPv6 header. A fragmented packet
is carried in frames containing the fragmentation header.
• IPv6 header compression: To minimize the overhead of sending IPv6 messages in
IEEE 802.15.4 frames, 6LoWPAN provides stateless compression mechanisms for
both IPv6 and transport headers that take advantage of cross-layer redundancies
between protocols such as source and destination addressing, payload length, traffic
class and flow labels.
Figure 4.17: 6LoWPAN architecture
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Another important feature of the 6LoWPAN layer is the ability to provide link layer packet
forwarding. It provides a very efficient and low overhead mechanism for forwarding multi hop
packets in a mesh network.
4.14.1. Security options
This adaptation layer does not directly offer any security mechanism. On the other hand, it is
placed over the 802.15.4 that offer security mechanisms at the data link layer. Furthermore,
since it enables IPv6 at the network layer, 6LoWPAN enable the use of security mechanisms
like IPsec, DTLS or any other IP-based upper later security mechanism.
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5. Analysis of the survey results
In  this  chapter,  a  comparison  of  the  security  options  of  all  the  surveyed  networking
technologies is presented, comparing them to one another.
Confidentiality Integrity Authentication Freshness Availability Authorization
Ethernet      
PLC ●   ●  
RFID ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
NFC      
Bluetooth  ● ● ●  
Wi-Fi    ●  
802.15.4    ●  ○
ZigBee ● ● ● ●  
Thread ● ● ● ●  ●
Z-Wave ● ● ● ●  
SigFox    ●  ●
EC-GSM-IoT
LTE-M
NB-IoT
●   ●  ●
LoRaWAN ●    ○ ●
●Fulfilled, ○ Not fulfilled,    Partially
Table 5.1: Security options comparison
Most of the surveyed technologies, but RFID, offers a good level of security services, at least
on the latest  version of  their  specifications.  On the other  hand,  some of  them  maintain
backward-compatibility to older version(s) leaving the option of exploit for known flaws on
new systems.
Most of them base their security services on symmetric cryptography, specifically on AES-
128 which is considered a robust cryptographic algorithm.
Confidentiality, Integrity, Authentication and Freshness can be achieved with a good security
level in most of the technologies, if the devices are properly configured and deployed.
Availability is difficult  to achieve for technologies based on wireless communications, but
techniques like frequency hopping and mesh network topology may help to mitigate the
impact of a DoS attack.
The use of symmetric cryptography force them to perform secure key management. This is
what  some  of  the  technologies  failed  to  achieve  in  their  earlier  versions.  Most  of  the
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technologies tend to use some kind of out-of-band method. Last versions started to use
asymmetric cryptography in trust establishment procedure between new device and network.
5.1. Confidentiality
Most of the surveyed technologies offers confidentiality services for the data sent through
the network. The following table summarizes and compares these services for each of the
technologies.
Confidentiality Description
Ethernet  Not offered by the 802.3.
AES-128 GCM if 802.1AE is implemented.
PLC ● AES-128  CBC.  Key  used  for  encryption  is  periodically  changed  andsecurely distributed using a different key for that purpose.
RFID ○ Not offered.
NFC  NFC-SEC uses AES-128 in CTR mode.
Bluetooth 
AES-128 in CCM mode.
On the other hand, there exists some configurable security levels that
does not perform data encryption and some issues are known on the
pairing procedure from where the key is derived.
Bluetooth Mesh encrypts all the messages within the mesh network.
Wi-Fi 
WEP and WAP uses vulnerable stream cipher RC4 and several design
flaws are known that make its use not recommended.
WPA2 uses AES-128/256 in CCM or GCM modes.
802.15.4 
AES-128 in CCM mode.
On the other hand, older versions of the specification have the option of
only  ciphering  the  data  without  authentication  and  since  the  Counter
mode is used it suffers from the same nonce attacks. Furthermore, there
is a No-security security level.
ZigBee ● AES-128 in CCM mode.
Thread ● AES-128 in CCM mode.
Z-Wave ● Z-Wave Plus uses AES-128 in OFB mode.Z-Wave with S2 commands uses AES-128 in CCM mode.
SigFox  Custom AES-128 based encryption.
On the other hand, its usage is optional.
EC-GSM-IoT
LTE-M
NB-IoT
● AES-128 CTR mode or SNOW 3G.
LoRaWAN ● AES-128 in CCM mode.
●Fulfilled, ○ Not fulfilled,    Partially
Table 5.2: Confidentiality mechanisms comparison
As can be seen, most of the surveyed technologies uses the AES cryptographic primitive.
AES  is  a  robust  primitive  to  use  at  the  time  of  writing  this  report.  It  is  used  in  CCM
84 Security Issues in Internet of Things
authenticated encryption mode with a key of 128 bits of size. The size of the AES key is
considered enough for near term future system use according to Algorithms, Key Size and
Parameters recommendations from the European Union Agency for Network and Information
Security (ENISA) [85]. SNOW 3G isa stream cipher and it is considered robust.
The CCM mode implies the use of block cipher Counter (CTR) mode. The security of CTR
mode is  robust  but  it  strongly  depends  on  that  the  counter  value  is  not  repeated.  The
802.15.4  specification  correctly  defines  that  when  the  counter  associated  to  a  key  is
exhausted, the key in no more usable. The technologies based on the 802.15.4 are correctly
implementing this fact too.
802.1AE is using AES-128 in GCM mode. GCM mode is considered robust too and it is more
computationally efficient since only an AES computation is needed.
WAP2 is specifying as one of the possible ciphers to use the AES-256, thus enhancing the
security by using a bigger key size.
SigFox is using a custom algorithm based on AES-128. Since it is proprietary solution, no
information on the actual algorithm was found. Due to the size of the SigFox messages’
payload (12 bytes at most), the standard usage of AES does not apply (AES block size is 16
bytes). So, some kind of cipher-text truncation may be applied.
5.1.1. Found issues
Some of the surveyed technologies have the option to disable the confidentiality services
(802.15.4, Bluetooth, SigFox) and may have it disabled by default. If the final application is
managing sensitive data, it may be clearly recommended to enable confidentiality services
on system deployment.
For the case of Bluetooth, low entropy keys are derived from the non-secure pairing modes
enabling brute force attack to be practical. The last BLE version (4.2) fixed that problem by
the use of Diffie-Hellman key exchange in order to get high entropy keys after pairing.
The WiFi  security protocols WEP and WPA uses the RC4 for  data confidentiality.  It  has
several known problems that makes this cryptographic primitive to be not  recommended
anymore.  The key sizes used in  this  protocols  (40 to 104 bits)  are also considered not
enough.
ZigBee bootstrapping  suffers  from several  problems that  affect  the  confidentiality  of  the
system like the Network key sent in to a joining device in clear text if Residential mode is
configured or the usage of a default known key for protecting the Network key distribution.
So, it is recommended to not configure the Residential mode and to change the default key
to a new value before the system is operational.
LoRaWAN is  partially  using  the  802.15.4  security  scheme.  It  wrongly  resets  the  frame
counter when a device joins the network or when the frame counter is exhausted. It impacts
the security of the CTR mode. On the other hand, the former method can be fixed by using
over-the-air joining mode and the last one is partially impractical because of the low number
of messages intended in this kind of networks. Nevertheless, it is recommended to fix this
fact.
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5.2. Integrity
Most of the surveyed technologies are providing mechanisms to verify the integrity of the
data sent through the network. The following table summarizes them.
Integrity Description
Ethernet 
CRC-32 over the frame header and payload.
Note that  while the CRC provides some integrity protection,  it  is  not
considered to provide cryptographic integrity as it can be easily forged.
802.1AE uses AES-128 in GCM mode including 8 bytes MIC.
PLC  CRC-32 over the frame header and payload included in the encrypted
payload.
RFID ○
CRC-16 over the frame header and payload.
Note that  while the CRC provides some integrity protection,  it  is  not
considered to provide cryptographic integrity as it can be easily forged.
NFC 
CRC-16 over the frame header and payload.
Note that  while the CRC provides some integrity protection,  it  is  not
considered to provide cryptographic integrity as it can be easily forged.
NFC-SEC uses AES-128 based 12 bytes MIC computation.
Bluetooth ● AES-128 in CCM mode including 4 bytes MIC.8 bytes MIC can be used in the Bluetooth Mesh.
Wi-Fi 
WEP uses CRC-32.
WAP uses a custom keyed hashing function (20 bits security) TKIP.
WPA2 uses AES-128/256 in CCM or GCM modes.
802.15.4 
AES-128 in CCM mode including 4 / 8 / 16 bytes MIC.
On the other hand, older versions of the specification have the option of
only ciphering the data without integrity checking.
Furthermore, there is a No-security security level.
ZigBee ● AES-128 in CCM mode including 4 / 8 / 16 bytes MIC.
Thread ● AES-128 in CCM mode including 4 / 8 / 16 bytes MIC.
Z-Wave ●
Z-Wave Plus uses AES-128 CMAC with 8 bytes MIC.
Z-Wave with S2 commands uses AES-128 in CCM mode including 8
bytes MIC.
SigFox  Authentication token based on AES-128 with 2 - 5 bytes MIC.
EC-GSM-IoT
LTE-M
NB-IoT
 AES-128 CMAC with 4 bytes MIC or SNOW 3G.
LoRaWAN  AES-128 in CCM mode including 4 bytes MIC.
●Fulfilled, ○ Not fulfilled,    Partially
Table 5.3: Integrity mechanisms comparison
Most  of  the  surveyed  technologies  opted  for  combining  the  integrity  checking  and  the
authentication  mechanisms  in  a  single  Message  Integrity  Code.  Most  of  them  use  the
included MIC in the AES-218 CCM and others use the AES CMAC one. The security of the
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CMAC Message Authentication Code is robust if the cryptographic primitive is strong enough
(AES in this case) and if the final MIC value is not truncated in excess.
ECMA-386  NFC-SEC-01  uses  AES-XCBC-MAC-96  for  the  integrity  and  authentication
checking. So, 12 bytes MIC is used. This is one of the options supported by IPsec.
802.1AE uses AES-128 in GCM mode including an 8 bytes MIC.
SigFox is using a custom algorithm based on AES-128. The size of the used MIC is 2 to 5
bytes. Since it is proprietary solution, no information on the actual algorithm was found.
5.2.1. Found issues
Some  of  the  surveyed  technologies  use  a  CRC  checksum  to  provide  some  integrity
protection, but CRC is not considered to provide cryptographic integrity as it can be easily
forged after data manipulation. An adversary with the capability to intercept a message and
change its content can manipulate the data, compute the new CRC value and update the
CRC value in the message.
The PLC is also using a CRC for data integrity protection. But, since it is including the CRC
in the encrypted payload,  an adversary does not  have a practical  way of  modifying the
protected message in a way that after decryption the CRC will be valid. The adversary can
modify the message but  at  the receiving side the modification can be detected and the
message can be dropped.
WiFi  security  protocols  WEP  and  WAP  does  not  provide  robust  integrity  checking
mechanism. The former one is based on CRC and the last is based on TKIP that have
several known problems and its security is put on the same level of a 20-bits key.
802.15.4  have  the  option  to  not  protect  neither  the  confidentiality  nor  the  integrity  /
authenticity of the messages selecting the “No security” security level. It is recommended not
to use this security level for security relevant applications.
Some of the surveyed technologies are truncating the output of a CMAC. A MAC function
with security 2s should have an output size of at least s bits. If we truncate the MAC output
by e percent, then the security drops to 2e·s, as stated in section 4.2 of the document [85].
The size of the AES CMAC is 16 bytes and some technologies are truncating it to its half (8
bytes) or even a quarter of it (4 bytes). The NIST SP 800-38B [86] recommends that at least
8  bytes  MAC  should  be  used  as  protection  against  guessing  attacks.  Some  of  the
technologies allows to configure the size of the MIC, it is recommended to use the full size or
at least a size of 8 bytes.
SigFox is truncating an authentication token based on AES to 2-5 bytes in size. This fact is
dramatically reducing its security. But since no more information was found about the actual
mechanism and the actual size of the protected payload is small, no more conclusion can be
devised.
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5.3. Authentication
Most of the surveyed technologies are providing mechanisms to verify the authenticity of the
data sent through the network. The following table summarizes them.
Authentication Description
Ethernet  802.1AE uses AES-128 in GCM mode including 8 bytes MIC.
PLC  CRC-32 over the frame header and payload included in the encrypted
payload.
RFID ○ Not offered.
NFC  NFC-SEC uses AES-128 based 12 bytes MIC computation.
Bluetooth ● AES-128 in CCM mode including 4 bytes MIC.8 bytes MIC can be used in the Bluetooth Mesh.
Wi-Fi 
WEP uses encrypted CRC-32.
WAP uses a custom keyed hashing function TKIP.
WPA2 uses AES-128/256 in CCM or GCM modes.
802.15.4 
AES-128 in CCM mode including 4 / 8 / 16 bytes MIC.
On the other hand, older versions of the specification have the option of
only ciphering the data without integrity checking.
Furthermore, there is a No-security security level.
ZigBee ● AES-128 in CCM mode including 4 / 8 / 16 bytes MIC.
Thread ● AES-128 in CCM mode including 4 / 8 / 16 bytes MIC.
Z-Wave ●
Z-Wave Plus uses AES-128 CMAC with 8 bytes MIC.
Z-Wave with S2 commands uses AES-128 in CCM mode including 8
bytes MIC.
SigFox  Authentication token based on AES-128 with 2 - 5 bytes MIC.
EC-GSM-IoT
LTE-M
NB-IoT
 AES-128 CMAC with 4 bytes MIC or SNOW 3G.
LoRaWAN  AES-128 in CCM mode including 4 bytes MIC.
●Fulfilled, ○ Not fulfilled,    Partially
Table 5.4: Authentication mechanisms comparison
Since most of the surveyed technologies opted for combining the integrity checking and the
authentication mechanisms in a single MIC, the Table 5.4 becomes exactly the same to the
shown in the Integrity mechanisms.
5.3.1. Found issues
MAC truncation should be considered. It is recommended to use at least 8 bytes MAC.
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5.4. Freshness
Most of the surveyed technologies are providing mechanisms to verify the freshness of the
data sent through the network to avoid replay attacks. The following table summarizes them.
Freshness Description
Ethernet  802.1AE includes a Packet Number included in the MIC computation.
PLC ● Nonces are used to prevent replay attacks.
RFID ○ Not offered.
NFC  Not offered.
NFC-SEC includes a Sequence Number in the MIC computation.
Bluetooth ● BLE have a counter that is incremented on every signed message.Bluetooth Mesh is adding a 24-bits sequence number to the messages.
Wi-Fi ●
WEP is adding a 24-bits IV.
WAP is adding a 48-bits IV.
WAP2 is adding a 48-bits packet number.
802.15.4 ● Frame counter per key included in the MIC computation.Always included in the frame header.
ZigBee ● Frame counter per key included in the MIC computation.Always included in the frame header.
Thread ● Frame counter per key included in the MIC computation.Always included in the frame header.
Z-Wave ●
Z-Wave plus is using a 64 bits nonces  generated using PRNG when
computing the MIC.
Z-Wave  S2  commands  implements  a  mechanism  to  agree  a  nonce
between the parties to be used as the initial value of the counter of the
CCM mode.
SigFox ● Sequence counter inside the authenticated payload.
EC-GSM-IoT
LTE-M
NB-IoT
● Sequence counter.
LoRaWAN  Frame counter.
●Fulfilled, ○ Not fulfilled,    Partially
Table 5.5: Freshness mechanisms comparison
Most of the surveyed technologies includes a frame or sequence counter in the message
header and in the MIC computation that enables to identify replayed messages.
5.4.1. Found issues
As explained above LoRaWAN wrongly resets the frame counter when a device joins the
network or when the frame counter is exhausted enabling replay attacks.
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5.5. Availability
Since most of the surveyed technologies are based on wireless communications, availability
is difficult to enforce because radio jamming can be achieved with off-the-shelf equipment. 
Availability Description
Ethernet 
Wired media.
On the other hand, some DoS attacks are possible misusing its control
mechanisms like MAC dynamic table and ARP.
PLC 
Wired media.
On the other hand, since its range is not controlled, it may be accessible
from outside of the building where jamming signal can be inserted from
a safe distance.
RFID ○ No protection. Radio jamming and the use of a “blocker tag” is possible.
NFC  No protection but its 10 cm range can help in avoiding jamming impact.
Bluetooth  Frequency hopping and Mesh topology.
Wi-Fi  Wireless  devices  often  support  dynamic  selection  of  channels.  But
crowded unlicensed frequency band.
802.15.4 
Last version supports frequency hopping techniques.
On the other hand, several identified DoS techniques based on media
access control frame counter exhaustion.
ZigBee  Mesh topology.
Thread  Self-healing Mesh topology.
Z-Wave  Mesh topology.
SigFox  The same message is  sent  several  times at  random moments using
different frequencies.
EC-GSM-IoT
LTE-M
NB-IoT
 Frequency hopping techniques. Multiple antennas can service the same
geographically position.
LoRaWAN ○ No protection offered.
●Fulfilled, ○ Not fulfilled,    Partially
Table 5.6: Availability mechanisms comparison
Wireless jamming based Denial of Service is difficult to defend but several techniques can
be used to diminish its impact or to reduce the practicality of the attack by the need more
complex adversary’s method.
Wired  technologies  (Ethernet,  PLC)  present  some  protection  inherent  from  its  physical
nature,  normally deployed over copper  twisted pair  or  fiber optic  wires.  Physical  access
needed, easy to detect and normally deployed with redundant paths.
NFC very short range (10 cm) can help on diminishing the effects of a jamming interference,
since a little increase of the reader’s power makes the jamming signal to increase its power
considerably to be able to maintain the same level of interference. Furthermore, since both
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devices are one in front of the other, the devices can be used as a shield to the external
interferences.
BLE employs a frequency hopping transceiver to combat interference and fading.
Mesh topologies (Bluetooth Mesh, ZigBee, Thread, Z-Wave) can be deployed in a way that if
some of the nodes of the mesh network is affected by a denial of service, the rest of the
network can be dynamically configured to route the messages through a different path.
SigFox  protocol  sends  each  message  at  three  random  times  and  on  three  different
frequencies. As a result, some resistance against Denial of Service attacks is achieved.
Most  of  the  surveyed  have  some  kind  of  frequency  hopping  technique  that  helps  on
mitigating the impact of such attack.
5.5.1. Found issues
Ethernet  control  mechanisms  can  be  misused  in  order  to  render  a  network  switch
inoperable. Dynamic MAC learning tables can be modified by sending lots of frames with a
target MAC address to make the switch do not send its frames to the correct port. The same
effect can be achieved with mechanisms like ARP.
PLC may cross the perimeter of a house if, for instance, a plug is available on the outside or
it is a building with a shared power feed. The signal can travel quite far down wires, and
despite fuse boxes offering some resistance to signals, it is usually found that the signal is
retrievable from the far off of the intended range.
RFID systems can be attacked by the so called “blocker tag”  that  simulates many tags
simultaneously  flooding  the  legitimate RFID  reads.  In  a  second  generation,  a  32-bit
password protected Kill command was introduced in order to deactivate the tags that can be
used to Denial of Service attacks.
CSMA-CA misuse, PANId conflict or spoofed acknowledge attacks can be used in 802.15.4
to implement DoS attacks.
In the 3GPP cellular  technologies,  the first  non-authenticated messages can be used to
temporarily block the access to a target device by the use of spoofed network access reject
messages.
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5.6. Authorization
Most of the surveyed technologies base its access control on the possession of credentials
that are provided during the device commissioning. Device joining procedure have to be
protected to avoid unauthorized devices to access the network.
Authorization Description
Ethernet  802.1X uses EAP-TLS with TLS 1.2 in order to authenticate new devices
connected to an Ethernet switch.
PLC  By  physical  connection,  custom  key  agreement  or  user  provided
credentials
RFID ○ No protection. By physical proximity and field generation.
NFC  NFC-SEC agrees a new key on each connection using ECDH with a
192-bits key.
Bluetooth 
Based on pairing modes. Some of them uses low-entropy secrets. Just
Works mode does not offer authentication at all.
BLE versions prior to 4.2 used a AES-128 based custom key exchange
with these low-entropy secrets.
BLE version  4.2  and  Mesh  is  using  ECDH in  order  to  provide  high
entropy key agreement to the pairing modes.
Wi-Fi 
Based on a pre-shared key. Several pairing modes (some of them non-
secure). WPA and WPA2 uses EAP supporting standard authentication
mechanisms.
802.15.4 ○ Not specified.
ZigBee 
Based on pre-shared key or install codes.
ZigBee IP introduces the use of PANA/EAP-TLS with pre-shared key or
certification based ECDH with ECDSA authentication.
Thread ●
Based  on  a  DTLS  handshake  with  Commissioning  credentials  to
manage  the  device  joining.  Another  DTLS  handshake  with  Joining
credentials to obtain the Network key. Requires user interaction.
Z-Wave  Z-Wave Plus is based on a custom protocol with pre-shared key.
Z-Wave S2 is based on ECDH-256 with required user interaction.
SigFox ● Different  key  per  device  personalized  during  manufacturing.  Nocommissioning is performed.
EC-GSM-IoT
LTE-M
NB-IoT
● Based on pre-shared keys.EPS AKA procedure to allow a device to connect to the network.
LoRaWAN ●
Over-the-air  activation  mode  uses  a  per  device  pre-shared  key  to
authenticate the joining device.
Personalization  mode  uses  keys  stored  during  manufacturing  an  no
commissioning is performed.
●Fulfilled, ○ Not fulfilled,    Partially
Table 5.7: Device commissioning mechanisms comparison
All  of  the  surveyed  technologies  are  based  on  the  possession  of  a  pre-shared  key  or
credentials. Most of them use a master secret installed in the device during manufacturing or
by an out-of-band method prior device deployment. These credentials will be used as the
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secret for a key agreement protocol between the joining device and the network in order to
derive final keys to be used to implement the other security services. Other systems install
the final keys directly to the device (SigFox, LoRaWAN, 3GPP).
802.1X implements access to the Ethernet network by the use of standard EAP-TLS. 802.1X
offers periodic re-authentication with key exchange.
PLC HomePlug AV is changing the key used to protect the data periodically and securely
distributing it with a different key intended only for that use.
NFC-SEC is using ECDH with a 192-bits key to exchange a new key on every connection. It
has to be noted that Diffie-Hellman key exchange is not protected against Man in the Middle
attacks.  On the other hand,  NFC very short  range (10 cm) can help on diminishing the
effects since the transmission party can be monitoring the field while transmitting in order to
detect the attack.
WiFi WPA2 uses EAP supporting standard authentication mechanisms. Furthermore, they
are changing the key periodically and distributing the new key using specific key-wrapping
key.
Bluetooth  Low Energy v4.2  and  Mesh introduced a  ECDH key exchange  in  the  pairing
process in order to provide high entropy key material for the channel protection. 
ZigBee IP is using PSK or ECDH EAP-TLS for device joining. It maintains the PANA session
in order to securely perform Network key distribution.
Thread is using an elliptic curve variant of J-PAKE (EC-JPAKE) for key agreement while
providing Non-interactive Zero-Knowledge proof  two authenticate both peers based on a
passphrase. It offers key rotation based on synchronized key generation on every device.
Z-Wave S2 is using ECDH with a 256-bits key. To provide peer authentication, part of the
joining device’s public key used in the key agreement is not sent over-the-air but provided by
some other out-of-band method.
3GPP IoT technologies are using EPS AKA procedure to perform mutual authentication and
exchange a key from where keys for protecting the communication channel are derived.
LoRaWAN over-the-air  commissioning is based on a per device pre-shared key used to
perform key agreement and derive the keys for channel protection. 
5.6.1. Found Issues
Some of  the surveyed technologies base its access control  on the knowledge of  a pre-
shared  credentials.  Some manufacturers  tend  to  set  this  credentials  to  a  default  value
publicly available in the devices’ documentation.
Several ways to join a device in a PLC HomePlug AV network imply the use of a low entropy
password, sometimes a default password equal for all the devices of a same manufacturer.
In version of BLE prior to v4.2, it is offered non-secure pairing modes like Just Works that
does not offer authentication, or Passkey mode that uses a low-entropy secret in order to
exchange  a  key.  Just  Works  and  Passkey  modes  are  susceptible  to  be  attacked  by
eavesdropping and secret brute force attacks.
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Some WiFi offer WPS which has design flaws that allows brute force attack to recover the
secret (e.g. WPS PIN.). Some implementation flaws were also found on commercial devices.
Some manufacturers configure default password based on public data like the SSID or the
MAC address of the WiFi access point. WEP and WAP does not change the key once is
established.
ZigBee specify a Residential mode in which the network key is transmitted unsecured over-
the-air  and  thus  this  is  a  serious  vulnerability  for  the  security  of  the  ZigBee  enabled
networks.  In non-Residential  mode, device commissioning is based on a pre-shared key
between the Trust Center and the joining device. A default Trust Center link key is provided
in the specification that all the compliant devices may use introducing a risk to the network
key secrecy.  ZigBee is  distributing a new network  key protected with the old key using
multicast.
Z-Wave Plus suffered from implementation errors on commercial devices that enabled the
attacker to reset the established key to a known value. It is also discovered that a default
pre-shared key was used in these devices.
5.7. Common issues
The following common issues can be defined to affect most of the surveyed technologies:
• Unique network-wide shared key: Most the technologies are based on symmetric
key and uses a unique symmetric key shared among all the network participants. The
main issue with this fact is that the impact of compromising the key in one device will
affect the security of the whole network. An attacker that compromises this key will be
able to eavesdrop all the future data going through the network and to inject new
data to the network.
The  fact  that  this  shared  key  may  be  stored  in  a  low-cost,  low-resources  and
physically accessible unattended device makes the chances of key compromising to
be high.
Some of the systems adequately change this key periodically but if the method to
protect the new key distribution is based on using the compromised one, the attacker
will be able to obtain the value of the new key.
In the particular case of the Thread, key management uses a key rotation algorithm
based on the use of the shared key and a monotonic counter. So, if the attacker is in
possession of the key, she will be able to compute all the future and past keys by
applying  the  algorithm  on  future  and  past  values  of  the  counter.  In  the  Thread
documentation, it is noted that this shared key is not typically used as the only form
of protection within the Thread network.
• Custom  cryptographic  mechanisms:  Some  of  the  technologies  in  its  earlier
versions designed its own cryptographic mechanisms.
For instance, WiFi’s WEP and WAP security mechanism, BLE in its versions prior to
the version 4.2 and the Z-Wave Plus. They all end having design vulnerabilities.
A cryptographic scheme isn't secure until it has been extensively attacked. So, it is
recommended to use already existing well-studied ones. Defining a new one along
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the application that will be deployed in the wild is not recommended. Note that design
flaws are more difficult to solve than implementation or configuration issues.
• Cryptographic support: Most of the surveyed technologies make use of the AES
cryptographic algorithm. It is a good choice for its security characteristics, but for
some of the technologies its 16-bytes block size may be excessive. Some of them
are truncating Message Integrity Codes based on AES to a size that dramatically
reduces its security.
• Usability first: Most of the surveyed technologies were not designed with security
from  the  beginning.  First  versions  of  the  specifications  to  cover  only  functional
aspects like usability, performance and data rate.
For instance, ZigBee Residential mode designed the first network key distribution to
a joining node to be sent in the clear prioritizing usability over security, assuming the
exploitation window is short. BLE prior to v4.2 offers the non-secure pairing mode
Just Works that does not offer authentication since it was designed for devices that
do not have the capability to show or input any credentials.
On the other hand, it is also understood that a security that cannot be used is not a
good security.
• Default credentials: Another consequence of the previous issue is the use of default
credentials. On pre-shared key scenarios where a new device has to share a secret
with an already in the network device, it is easier if the pre-shared key is the same on
all the manufactured devices. But this kind of decision may break the security of the
whole  system.  It  is  even  worse  if  the  default  credentials  are  defined  in  the
specification since all manufacturers may choose to use the same.
• Denial  of  Service:  Some  of  the  surveyed  technologies  do  not  provide  any
mechanism against DoS. Other offer frequency hopping, mesh topologies and self-
healing mechanisms, which may help in preventing such attacks.
• Security as an option: Some of the specifications does not mandate security or give
the option to not provide one of the security services (e.g. confidentiality). Some of
them have security disabled by default. Although security may be enabled in such a
system,  since  security  has  an  inevitable  penalty  on  system’s  performance  or
networking capabilities, some of the manufacturers or end users may tend to disable
security to get the better performance.
• Deployed  old  specification  versions:  The  time  between  a  new  version  of  a
specification and its deployment on actual devices is always considerable. This fact
was evident during the survey.
For instance, most of the technologies based on the 802.15.4 standard were still
using the 802.15.4-2006 version even though several security fixes were published in
the 2011 and 2015 versions.
Known flaws or vulnerabilities from the old specification may be inherited by the new
system. Some of the specifications solve this issue by putting its own security on top,
or by limiting the use of the base technology to the parts that are known to be secure.
On the other  hand,  others maintain  backward-compatibility  to  older  version(s)  for
practical reasons leaving the option of exploiting known flaws on new systems.
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For instance, you can still configure WEP security in a WiFi access point although it
has  been a  long  time after  it  was  known to  be vulnerable  and the existence of
multiple exploiting tools.
Some of the industry alliances manage this situation by timely marking as deprecated
the old specifications and the new version as mandatory for the certification of new
devices.
For  instance,  the  Z-Wave  Alliance  mandated  that  all  devices  submitted  for
certification after November 2016 should include the new security S2 protocol.
• Software update capability:  Some of  the  surveyed  technologies  does  not  have
enough downlink data rate (e.g. SigFox, LoRaWAN) to enable a practical software
update  mechanism.  Others  lack  the  provision  of  credentials  to  protect  the
mechanism.
5.8. Security Solutions
After the results of this study, the first solution will be to apply the general recommendation
to use the latest  versions of a network technology and to carefully configure its security
services to offer the desired security level. Depending on the final application one technology
or another may be more suited to be used.
• Hardware  security:  To  defend  a  device  against  physical  attacks  that  may
compromise  a  secret,  several  hardware  solutions  have  been  devised.  Hardware
Security Module (HSM) or Trusted Platform Module (TPM) are normally implemented
in  a  micro-controller  by  adding  a  processing  unit  and  memories  that  are  only
dedicated  to  security  related  functionality.  These  modules  are  protected  against
physical attacks. They can be used to store secret data and avoid its compromise.
Another hardware alternative is Physical Unclonable Function (PUF), it is a physical
entity that is embodied in a physical structure that is easy to evaluate but hard to
predict. Furthermore, an individual PUF device must be easy to make but practically
impossible to duplicate. PUFs evaluate manufacturing variations to generate unique
secrets inside a micro-controller,  avoiding storing the key in a non-secure general
purpose memory or in more expensive alternatives like HSM or TPM modules.
Hardware Random Number Generators play also an important role on the security of
the  systems  since  most  of  the  cryptographic  system  depends  on  the  quality  of
random numbers.
• Firmware update Over The Air (FOTA): The ability to securely update firmware of
deployed embedded devices over networks is one of essential features nowadays.
Vendors use the remote firmware update to provide new functionalities and also to
patch vulnerabilities on the embedded devices.  For securing the remote firmware
update,  asymmetric  cryptographic  algorithms such  as  ECC or  RSA are  normally
used. For instance, to provide integrity and authentication of the firmware.
Firmware updates may open the doors to attacks exploiting the update mechanism
itself. So, this kind of mechanism must be very well-studied before being deployed.
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The  document  [87] describes  the  development  of  a  design  for  such  an  update
process focusing on flexibility and feasibility - without neglecting security.
In  [88], a lightweight protocol is presented to update each device in a secure way.
The cryptographic keys employed are fresh and are not stored but reconstructed by
exploiting the Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) of the device hardware.
In  [89],  a  new firmware  update  scheme that  utilizes  a  Blockchain  technology  is
proposed to securely check a firmware version, validate the correctness of firmware,
and download the latest firmware for an IoT device.
• IP-based security mechanism adaptation: A general trend that can be observed is
the adaptation of the security mechanisms used in the traditional Internet. They are
being adapted to the specific characteristics of the devices and networks involved in
the IoT.
In  [90],  an adaptation of the IPsec Authenticated Header (AH) and Encapsulating
Security Payload (ESP) protocols is defined. In  [91], a collaboration of DTLS and
CoAP is proposed for IoT. It also proposed DTLS header compression scheme that
helps  to  reduce  packet  size,  energy  consumption  and  avoids  fragmentation  by
complying the 6LoWPAN standards.  In  [92], a 6LoWPAN compression for Internet
Key Exchange (IKE) version 2 is proposed. In the RFC 7925 [93], a profile for TLS
and DTLS version 1.2 is defined that offers communications security for resource-
constrained nodes.
• Lightweight  cryptography:  In  resource-constrained  environments,  conventional
cryptography  primitives  may  be  infeasible.  Numerous  research  activities  were
accomplished and led to plenty of block ciphers primitives for IoT. Recently the NIST
started a lightweight cryptography project to investigate the issues and then develop
a strategy for the standardization of lightweight cryptographic algorithms [94].
For  the  symmetric  key  cryptography,  some  of  the  ciphers  were  designed  by
simplifying  conventional,  well-analyzed  block  ciphers  to  improve  their  efficiency.
Alternatively, some of the algorithms are dedicated block ciphers that were designed
from scratch. PRESENT [95] is one of the first lightweight block cipher designs that
was proposed for constrained hardware environments. SIMON and SPECK [96] are
families of lightweight block ciphers that were designed to be simple, flexible, and
perform well in hardware and software. There are also algorithms from the 1990s
such as RC5 [97], TEA [98] and XTEA [99], which consist of simple round structures
that make them suitable for constrained software environments. They present smaller
block sizes, smaller key sizes and simpler rounds and key schedules. M. Cazorla et
al. [100] presented a comprehensive survey of lightweight algorithms and the results
of comparing them to each other in terms of operation and performance.
For the public key cryptography, alternative public-key cryptographic schemes with
shorter  keys  may  be  used  like  ECC,  Hyper-Elliptic  Curve  Cryptography  (HECC)
[101], NTRU [102] and BlueJay [103].
• Confidentiality with no cryptographic computations:  For  the technologies that
does  not  provide  security  like  RFID  or  the  NFC  without  the  NFC-SEC,  several
workarounds  have  been  presented  to  offer  security  services  without  the  use  of
cryptography. To protect confidentiality, solutions controlling eavesdroppers’ signal-to-
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noise ratio with artificial noise have emerged [104]. It proposes the reader to emit a
controlled noise while receiving the node’s answer, since the reader knows the noise
value, it can subtract it and recover the node data.
Haselsteiner  et  al.  [43] proposed  a  key  extraction  solution,  which  is  based  on
eavesdropper inability to determine direction of NFC transmissions. The idea is that
both devices, say Device A and Device B, send random data at the same time. While
sending random bits of 0 or 1, each device also listens to the RF field. When both
devices send a zero, the sum signal is zero and an attacker, who is listening, would
know that both devices sent a zero. This does not help. The same thing happens
when both, A and B, send a one. The sum is the double RF signal and an attacker
knows that both devices sent a one. It gets interesting once A sends a zero and B
sends a one or vice versa. In this case both devices know what the other device has
sent,  because  the  devices  know what  they  themselves  have  sent.  However,  an
attacker only sees the sum RF signal and he cannot figure out which device sent the
zero and which device sent the one.
Active  attacks  have  been  addressed  in  [105] with  distance  bounding  protocol.
Distance bounding is based on detecting round-trip delays caused by active man-in-
the-middle attackers. 
• Robust key management: RFC 4107 [106] discusses the trade-off between manual
and  automatic  key  management  and  recommends  the  use  of  automatic  key
management if the number of devices is considerable and any stream cipher such as
AES-CTR or AES-CCM is used.
Eschenauer and Gligor  [107] propose a key pre-distribution scheme that relies on
probabilistic key sharing among nodes within the sensor network. They try to avoid
the sharing of a single key that if compromised will compromise the whole network.
Their system works by distributing a key ring to each participating node in the sensor
network  before deployment.  Each key ring  should  consist  of  a number  randomly
chosen keys from a much larger pool of keys generated offline. The authors show
that, while not perfect, it is probabilistically likely that large sensor networks will enjoy
shared-key connectivity.
Adrian Perrig et al.  [108] propose a key-chain distribution system for their μTESLA
secure  broadcast  protocol.  The  basic  idea  of  the  μTESLA system  is  to  achieve
asymmetric cryptography by delaying the disclosure of the symmetric keys. In this
case a sender will broadcast a message generated with a secret key. After a certain
period of time, the sender will disclose the secret key. The receiver is responsible for
buffering the packet until  the secret key has been disclosed. After disclosure, the
receiver can authenticate the packet, provided that the packet was received before
the key was disclosed. One limitation of μTESLA is that some initial information must
be unicast to each sensor node before authentication of broadcast messages can
begin. 
• Intrusion Detection system (IDS): An Intrusion Detection system (IDS) is a device
or application that monitors a network for malicious activity. Two types of IDS can be
identified:  Signature-based  (recognizing  malicious  patters)  and  Anomaly-based
(recognizing deviations from a model of “normal traffic”). An IDS system can be used
to detect an attack in the network and react to it.
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In [109], a survey on IDS system in the WSN can be found. It categorizes the types
of IDS depending on the intrusion type, detection methodology, source of data and its
place in the network. There may be value if it were possible to single out a device,
which shows faulty behavior or has been compromised, and to shut that down in
some sense. 
• Threat analysis: The design for a device should study the potential security threats
considered in its design, and the specific security controls applied (if any) to remedy
or  limit  the  impact  of  each  threat.  This  analysis  encourages  making  deliberate,
explicit choices about security controls at design time rather than leaving security as
an afterthought. The results of this analysis are also useful later in the life cycle of a
device  if  it  becomes necessary to  enhance security.  For  instance,  it  can help  to
identify whether the original design choices fulfilled their intended function or failed to
do  so,  or  whether  a  newly  discovered  threat  was  not  anticipated  in  the  original
design.
• Standardization activities in IoT security: Regulators and interoperability bodies
should  develop  security  standards.  In  [110],  the  major  actors  of  standardization
efforts for IoT security and their relevant activities are presented. ITU-T published
recommendations that are directly related to IoT and its security in  [8] and  [111].
3GPP is defining LTE security, it issued two technical specifications series, namely
33series  (Security  aspects)  [112] and  35series  (Security  algorithms)  [113].
BroadBand Forum (BBF) released a set of technical reports and defines its own TR-
069 [114] protocol suite and data models for home network management. OneM2M
has  publications  related  to  authorization,  access  control,  confidentiality,
authentication, identification, trust and integrity verification, for instance in oneM2M-
TS-0003 [115] (Security Solutions) and oneM2M-TR-0008 [116] (Security Analysis).
Finally,  the  ETSI  M2M  technical  committee  debates  security  aspects  related  to
authentication, integrity, confidentiality, trust management and access control.
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6. Conclusions
This chapter contains the conclusions drawn from the results of this study together with
future work that suggests the security analysis of an actual implementation of the surveyed
technologies.
6.1. Conclusions
In  the  last  years,  a  huge  amount  of  IoT  systems  are  being  deployed.  However,  the
technologies  for  the  IoT  are  still  evolving  and  maturing.  The  idea  behind  the  IoT  to
interconnect  everything  is  so  broad  that  a  big  number  of  different  applications  and
technologies are involved. Since the development of standards is relatively slow to the fast
rate of IoT growth, several industrial alliances and consortiums have been created to fill in
the  gap.  They  develop  specifications  and  promote  collaboration  by  partners  but  may
compete against others. The IoT ecosystem ended up being formed by a plethora of different
specifications and standards.
Regarding to the security of these technologies, as seen through this study, many threats
and security challenges have to be solved to a successful IoT deployment.  Some of the
challenges presented are common in information security,  but they pose new challenges
since  most  of  the  participants  in  an  IoT system may be resources constrained devices
without enough processing power, memory or battery to implement the security mechanisms
that  are  usually  handled  by  libraries  like  OpenSSL and  TLS in  the  desktop  computers.
Deciding  on  an  encryption,  authentication  and  signature  algorithm  requires  a  thought
process to both efficiently and effectively secure a device.
Security should be a consideration through the whole system life cycle. Key decisions on
security should have been decided long before deployment. These include how keys should
be distributed to each device, if hardware-acceleration should be used, how updates can be
handled,  if  asymmetric  cryptography  is  a  viable  solution  for  the  device,  what  type  of
cryptographic algorithms should be used, etc. 
This study presented a comparative evaluation of IoT networking technologies with regard to
communication security requirements. IoT systems include technologies designed especially
for low-power devices, such as IEEE 802.15.4, LoRaWAN, Z-Wave while other technologies
used in  the traditional  Internet  or  the mobile  systems are being adapted to the specific
characteristics of the IoT. Some of them cover the physical and media access layers (IEEE
802.15.4, Wi-Fi, NFC and LoRaWAN) while others cover the entire networking stack (BLE,
Z-Wave, Thread). A selection of representative set of IoT networking technologies was made
with the objective to try to cover the whole spectrum of the already deployed IoT networking
solutions.
A total  of  thirteen IoT technologies were analyzed,  describing their  functionality,  security
options and found issues. Many different systems architectures, involved layers and security
solutions have been adopted by the different technologies and there is a lot of research in
many different  areas involving IoT.  Many different  kinds  of  adaptations  to protocols  and
authentication methods for IoT have been proposed which makes it very difficult to identify
the best solution. Therefore, there is the need of standardization in order to interconnect all
kinds of devices, protocols and security solutions.
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The general conclusion is that the current level of security in the IoT networking solutions is
quite good if  the latest specifications are used, they are correctly implemented and their
secure configuration is used. Most of the found issues were related to early versions of the
technology where naive trust assumptions were taken.
The personal  outcomes of  this  work  are  the understanding of  the  IoT’s  magnitude,  the
acquired  knowledge  of  a  new set  of  wireless  technologies  and  the  insight  on  how the
security mechanisms are used in actual systems.
Several open research questions should be addressed in the future for a successful IoT
deployment like efficient FOTA mechanisms that can be securely used on IoT devices, the
adaptation to the IoT of traditional Internet’s security mechanisms, the definition and security
proof of lightweight cryptographic algorithms and the standardization of the IoT security.
6.2. Limitations
What limited our efforts the most was the amount of available time for this study. IoT is such
an extensive concept that working with it is both difficult and time consuming. 
The amount of surveyed technologies and the lack of previous knowledge about most of
them required  additional  work  in  order  to  understand  its  concept  and  how the  security
services were devised.
Another  limitation  comes  from  the  fact  that  some  of  the  surveyed  technologies  are
proprietary  (e.g.  SigFox)  or  just  publicly  released  its  specifications  (e.g.  Z-Wave).  This
makes the research of information more difficult or even not possible.
6.3. Future work
Another interesting area of research would be to investigate how the security properties of
the  various  technologies’  specifications  transfer  to  practical  implementations,  given  the
limitations of IoT devices and the possible variations inherent in a complete stack. In the last
years, several ready-to-use tools have been released making the security analysis of this
kind of technology affordable. For instance, the Ubertooth [117] device for Bluetooth and the
KillerBee [118] for the ZigBee.
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Glossary
6LoWPAN IPv6 over Low power Wireless Personal Area Networks
3GPP 3rd Generation Partnership Project
6LBR 6LoWPAN Border Route
6LN 6LowPAN Node
ACL Access Control Lists
AES Advanced Encryption System
AIOTI Alliance for IoT Innovation
AP Access Point
APP Application layer
ARP Address resolution Protocol
ATT Attribute Protocol layer
BLE Bluetooth Low Energy
CBC Cipher Block Chaining mode
CCM Counter with CBC-MAC mode
CCMP Counter Mode CBC-MAC Protocol
CoAP Constrained Application Protocol
CoRE Constrained RESTful Environment
CPS Cyber-physical System
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
CSMA-CA Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance
CTR Counter mode
D-BPSK Differential Binary Phase Shift Keying
DdoS Distributed Denial of Service
DES Data Encryption Algorithm
DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
DoS Denial of Service
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DTLS Datagram Transport Layer Security
EAP Extensible Authentication Protocol
EAPOL EAP over LAN
EC-GSM-IoT Extended Coverage GSM for the Internet of Things
ECB Electronic Code Book mode
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
EDR Event Data Recorder
eGPRS Enhanced General Packet Radio Service
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ETSI European Telecommunications Standards Institute
EU Europe Union
FDMA Frequency Division Multiple Access
FFD Full-Function Device
GATT Generic Attribute Profile layer
GCM Galois Counter Mode
GCMP Galois counter Mode CBC-MAC Protocol
GFSK Gaussian Frequency Shift Keying
GSM Global System for Mobile Communications
GTS Guaranteed Time Slot
HAN Home Area Network
HCI Host Controller Interface
HF High Frequency
HMAC Hash-based Message Authentication Code
HSS Home Subscriber Server
IAB Internet Architecture Board
ICMP Internet Control Message Protocol
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
IERC European Research Cluster on the Internet of Things
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force
IoT Internet of Things
IOT-A Internet of Things - Architecture
IP Internet Protocol
IPSec Internet Protocol Security
IPv4 Internet Protocol version 4
IPv6 Internet Protocol version 6
ISM Industrial, Scientific and Medical band
ITS Intelligent Transport Systems
ITU-T International Telegraph Union Telecommunication Standardization Sector
JTAG Joint Test Action Group
L2CAP Logical Link Control and Adaptation Protocol layer
LAN Local Area Network
LF Low Frequency
LTE Long-Term Evolution
LTK Long Term Key
M2M Machine to Machine
MAC Medium Access Control layer
MACsec Medium Access Control Security
MIC Message Integrity Code
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MitM Man In The Middle
MLE Mesh Link Establishment
MME Mobility Management Entity
MSK Master Session Key
NB Narrow-band
NB-IoT Narrow-band IoT
NET Network layer
NFC Near Field communication
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer
OFB Output FeedBack mode
OOB Out-of-Band
P2P Peer to peer
PAKE Password Authenticated Key Exchange
PAN Personal Area Network
PANA Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access
PC Personal Computer
PDU Protocol Data Unit
PHY Physical layer
PIB PAN Information Base
PIN Personal Identification Number
PLC Power Line Communications
PRF Pseudo-Random Function
PRNG Pseudo-Random Number Generator
PSK Pre-Shared Key
RC4 Rivest Cipher 4
REED Router-Eligible End Device
REST Representational State Transfer
RF Radio Frequency
RFC Request For Comment
RFD Reduced Function Device
RFID Radio Frequency Identification
ROLL Routing Over Low power and Lossy networks
RPL Pv6 Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks
RSA Rivest, Shamir y Adleman
SDO Standards Developing Organizations
SED Sleepy End Device
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SIG Special Interest Group
SIM Subscriber Identity Module (an application running on a UICC)
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SSID Service Set Identifier
STK Short Term Key
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TDMA Time Division Multiple Access
TK Temporary Key
TKIP Temporal Key Integrity Protocol 
TLS Transport Layer Security
TP Transport layer
UDP User Datagram Protocol
UE User Equipment
UHF Ultra High Frequency
UICC Universal Integrated Circuit Card (sometimes known as the SIM card)
UNB Ultra-narrow Band
US United States
VLAN Virtual Local Area Network
VPN Virtual Private Network
WAN Wide Area Network
WEP Wireless Equivalent Privacy
WiFi Wireless Fidelity
WLAN Wireless Local Area Network
WPA Wi-Fi Protected Access
WPS WiFi Protected Setup
WSN Wireless Sensor Networks
XOR eXclusive OR
Z/IP ZigBee IP
